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1. Introduction1
Many	moral	theories	hold	that	what	an	agent	morally	ought	to	do	is	
determined	in	part	by	the	goodness	of	the	outcomes	of	those	actions	
currently	available	to	her.	However,	some	moral	theories	go	further	
and	claim	that	what	an	agent	morally	ought	to	do	is	determined	sole-
ly	 by	 the	 goodness	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	 her	 actions.	 Following	one	
standard	philosophical	convention,	we	will	call	this	stronger	thesis	
consequentialism.2
It	 seems	quite	 clear	 that	bringing	 about	 good	outcomes	 is	 one	
thing	 that	 there	 is	moral	 reason	to	do.	But	why	 think	 that	promot-
ing	the	good	is	the	only	thing	that	morality	prescribes?	One	way	of	
defending	this	thesis	is	to	employ	substantive	normative	arguments,	
which	seek	to	show	that	the	plausibility	of	moral	reasons	to	do	other	
1.	 This	 paper	 has	 benefited	 from	many	 conversations	 and	 from	written	 feed-
back	on	many	previous	drafts.	We	would	particularly	like	to	thank	Liz	Ander-
son,	David	Braddon-Mitchell,	Jonathan	Dancy,	Stephen	Darwall,	Tom	Dough-
erty,	Andy	Egan,	Mylan	Engel,	Robert	L.	Frazier,	Allan	Gibbard,	Bob	Goodin,	
Paul	Hurley,	Nadeem	Hussain,	Frank	Jackson,	Christine	Korsgaard,	Ira	Lind-
say,	Dustin	Locke,	Tristram	McPherson,	Timothy	Michael,	Alastair	Norcross,	
Doug	 Portmore,	 Peter	 Railton,	 Ryan	 Robinson,	 Tamar	 Schapiro,	 Jeff	 Sebo,	
Scott	Shapiro,	Michael	Smith,	Nic	Southwood,	David	Velleman,	Ralph	Wedg-
wood,	Caroline	West,	and	 two	anonymous	readers	 for	Philosophers’ Imprint.	
Earlier	versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	the	University	of	Michigan,	
Ethics	Discussion	Group	(June	2007),	The	First	Annual	Rocky	Mountain	Eth-
ics	Congress	at	the	University	of	Colorado	Boulder	(August	2008),	and	The	
Twelfth	Annual	Oxford	Graduate	Conference	in	Philosophy	at	the	University	
of	Oxford	 (November	2008).	Thanks	 to	all	 those	who	offered	us	 feedback	
during	those	presentations.
2.	 While	this	description	may	suggest	that	only	theories	that	employ	an	impar-
tial	or	agent-neutral	kind	of	goodness	can	count	as	“consequentialist”	in	our	
sense,	it	will	become	clear	how	our	arguments	extend	to	relativized	versions	
of	consequentialism	(of	the	kind	defended	by	Sen	1983,	Dreier	1993,	Smith	
2003,	Louise	2004,	and	Portmore	2011).	This	use	of	‘consequentialism’	does	
restrict	its	referent	to	“direct”	or	“act-consequentialist”	theories,	according	to	
which	the	moral	status	of	our	acts	is	determined	exclusively	by	the	goodness	
of	their	outcomes.	While	these	are	the	theories	on	which	we	will	be	focusing,	
we	will	also	have	something	to	say	about	“indirect	consequentialist”	theories,	
according	to	which	the	moral	status	of	our	acts	is	determined	exclusively	by	
the	goodness	of	the	outcomes	of	something	else	(like	everyone’s	accepting	or	
acting	on	a	set	of	rules	that	ranks	our	acts	in	certain	ways).
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able	for	a	moral	theory	to	be	able	to	explain	why	there	is	reason	for	
us	to	be	moral	by	identifying	the	content	of	morality	with	something	
which	general	facts	about	the	nature	of	practical	reasons	entail	there	is	
practical	reason	to	do.	There	seems	to	be	an	inexorable	connection	be-
tween	the	thought	that	a	state	of	affairs	is	good	and	the	idea	that	there	
is	 reason	 for	us	 to	bring	 it	about.	While	 there	may	be	other	equally	
plausible	thoughts	about	what	there	is	practical	reason	to	do,	like	the	
idea	that	there	is	reason	to	promote	one’s	own	interests	or	satisfy	one’s	
desires,	none	of	these	things	could	plausibly	be	identified	with	what	
there	is	moral	reason	to	do.	Thus,	the	consequentialist	view	that	moral-
ity	prescribes	that	we	bring	about	good	states	of	affairs	not	only	seems	
substantively	plausible	but	offers	an	explanation	of	why	there	is	rea-
son	to	be	moral.	We	will	call	this	the	“top-down”	strategy	of	arguing	in	
favor	of	consequentialism.5
asking	“Why	should	we	take	moral	reasons	to	be	genuine	practical	reasons?”	
and	the	question	‘Why	be	moral?’	as	asking	either	the	foregoing	or	“Why,	just	
because	the	moral	reasons	in	favor	of	doing	something	morally	require	us	to	
do	it,	should	we	think	there	is	decisive	practical	reason	to	do	it?”
5.	 A	number	of	prominent	advocates	of	consequentialism	employ	some	version	
of	the	top-down	strategy.	For	example,	consider	the	case	of	Sidgwick	(1907).	
Since	Sidgwick	was	concerned	not	merely	with	what	there	is	moral	reason	to	
do	but	with	what	there	is	practical	reason	to	do	(see	Bk.	I,	ch.	iii),	we	can	read	
his	argument	for	the	“maxim	of	Benevolence”	in	Bk.	III,	ch.	xiii,	as	holding	that,	
just	as	it	seems	self-evident	that	there	is	practical	reason	to	aim	at	one’s	own	
greatest	good,	“the	good	of	one	individual	is	of	no	more	importance,	from	the	
point	of	view	(if	I	may	say	so)	of	the	Universe,	than	the	good	of	any	other	….	
And	as	a	rational	being	I	am	bound	to	aim	at	good	generally	…	not	merely	
at	a	particular	part	of	it.”	So,	Sidgwick	suggests	in	his	concluding	chapter,	if	
our	moral	reasons	(or,	 in	his	terminology,	our	other-directed	or	“social”	du-
ties)	exclusively	favor	promoting	the	“universal	Good”,	practical	reason	will	
endorse	moral	reasons	(even	if	it	also	threatens	to	contradict	itself	by	giving	
an	equally	strong	endorsement	of	conflicting	considerations	of	self-interest).	
Similar	(if	more	“instrumentalist”)	arguments	are	given	by	Smart	(1956,	353),	
Singer	(1979,	10–13	and	212–220),	and	Railton	(1986,	189–190	and	202–204).	
The	logically	strongest	version	of	the	top-down	strategy	defends	a	teleologi-
cal	conception	of	practical	reasons	[TCR],	according	to	which	all	reasons	to	
act	must	be	reasons	to	bring	about	outcomes	that	are	good	(from	some	per-
spective,	even	if	not	from	an	impartial	perspective).	For	a	sustained	argument	
along	 these	 lines,	 see	Portmore	 2011	 (although	Portmore	does	not	 put	his	
favored	 version	 of	 TCR	 or	 consequentialism	 in	 terms	 of	 reasons	 to	 bring	
about	good	outcomes,	 it	will	become	clear	 from	our	account	of	evaluative	
things	does	not	withstand	reflective	scrutiny.3	Many	such	arguments	
begin	 by	 observing	 that	 it	 is	 overwhelmingly	 plausible	 that	 there	
are	moral	reasons	to	do	what	is	good	for	others	and	to	avoid	doing	
what	 is	bad	 for	 them.	These	arguments	 concede	 that	 it	 is	 initially	
plausible	that	there	are	moral	reasons	to	do	other	things,	like	keep	
our	promises	and	respect	 the	autonomy	of	others,	even	when	this	
does	 not	 bring	 about	 the	 best	 overall	 consequences.	 Further,	 it	 is	
initially	plausible	that	reasons	not	to	harm	others	are	stronger	than	
reasons	to	benefit	them,	and	that	reasons	to	benefit	our	loved	ones	
are	stronger	than	reasons	to	benefit	strangers.	Such	considerations	
do	 initially	 count	 against	 consequentialism.	 But,	 proponents	 of	
these	consequentialist	arguments	contend,	there	are	good	reasons	
to	doubt	that	the	plausibility	of	these	distinct	reasons	and	weighting	
principles	can	withstand	our	getting	clearer	about	what	exactly	they	
could	amount	to.	If	this	is	correct,	our	plausible	moral	reasons	of	be-
neficence	and	non-malfeasance	are	best	seen	as	instances	of	moral	
reasons	to	bring	about	the	overall	best	outcomes,	which	exhaust	the	
content	of	morality.	We	will	call	this	the	“bottom-up”	strategy	of	ar-
guing	in	favor	of	consequentialism.
A	second	way	of	defending	the	consequentialist	thesis,	often	pur-
sued	in	tandem	with	the	bottom-up	strategy,	is	to	maintain	that	conse-
quentialism	enjoys	a	kind	of	general	theoretical	advantage	that	stems,	
not	 from	 the	 failure	 of	 non-consequentialist	 considerations	 to	with-
stand	scrutiny,	but	from	general	reflections	on	the	nature	of	morality	
and	 reasons	 to	 act.	While	 it	 is	 controversial	whether	 there	 is	neces-
sarily	reason	for	everyone	to	be	moral,	it	seems	clear	that	morality	is	
something	important,	in	the	sense	that	there	is	strong	practical	reason	
for	most	people	to	be	moral	most	of	the	time.4	It	therefore	seems	desir-
3.	 See	for	instance	Sidgwick	1907	(esp.	Bk.	III,	ch.	xi,	and	Bk.	IV,	ch.	ii–iii);	Ben-
nett	1966,	1981,	1995;	Nielsen	1972;	Kagan	1989;	and	Norcross	2003.
4.	 As	we	will	use	the	phrases,	“practical	reasons	to	do	A”	(or	just	“reasons	to	do	
A”	with	no	further	modifier)	are	considerations	that	count	in	favor	of	doing A 
in	the	most	general	normative	sense,	while	“moral	reasons	to	do	A”	are	con-
siderations	that	contribute	to	A’s	deontic	status	as	morally	permissible,	right,	
or	good	to	do.	We	can	understand	the	question	‘Why	care	about	morality?’	as	
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cannot	 be	 a	 sufficient	 justification	of	 it,	 else	 slaveholders	would	be	
justified	in	believing	that	skin	color	has	intrinsic	moral	significance.7
But	while	it	seems	implausible	in	the	abstract	that	skin	color	has	
intrinsic	moral	relevance,	it	actually	seems	—	at	least	at	the	outset	of	
inquiry	—	plausible	 in	 the	abstract	 that	 inflicting	harm	 is	 intrinsically	
worse	than	failing	to	provide	aid	and	that	setting	out	to	harm	someone	
is	intrinsically	worse	than	harming	her	as	a	foreseen	consequence	of	
one’s	conduct.	 Indeed,	 the	 intrinsic	moral	 relevance	of	 these	 factors	
seems	—	again,	at	the	outset	of	inquiry	—	no	less	directly	plausible	than	
the	idea	that	there	is	a	general	moral	requirement	to	benefit	others	or	
promote	the	good.	Of	course,	if	Kagan	can	show	that	the	direct	plausi-
bility	of	the	intrinsic	relevance	of	the	doing	/	allowing	and	intending	
/	foreseeing	distinctions	cannot	withstand	careful	clarification,	he	will	
have	made	a	compelling	case	against	non-consequentialist	constraints,	
and	some	of	his	arguments	that	“bring	out	the	problems	and	unpalat-
able	implications	of	adopting”	them	really	do	tend	in	this	direction.8 
But	why	should	we	agree	with	the	legitimacy	of	Kagan’s	demand	that	
proponents	 of	 constraints	 provide	 an	 independent	 justification	 for	
why	we	should	accept	them	beyond	their	direct	plausibility	even if	this	
plausibility	 withstands	 the	 careful	 clarification	 of	 their	 content	 and	
how	 they	apply	 to	various	 cases?	Nowhere	 in	his	book	does	Kagan	
provide	a	similar,	direct-plausibility-independent	justification	of	mor-
al	reasons	to	promote	the	good,	or	any	reason	to	doubt	that,	if	such	a	
justification	could	be	provided,	plausibility-independent	justifications	
of	other	moral	factors	could	be	just	as	easily	provided.9
7.	 See	especially	Kagan	1989,	11–15,	111–127,	and	165–182.
8.	 We	have	in	mind	especially	his	explorations	of	the	implications	of	the	doing	
/	allowing	distinction	 for	decision	making	under	 risk	 (87–91);	 the	possibil-
ity	 that	 the	ways	we	draw	the	distinctions	are	gerrymandered	 functions	of,	
and	 thus	cannot	 justify,	our	 intuitions	about	particular	cases	 (101–106	and	
138–144);	and	the	particular	difficulty	of	constructing	a	plausible	story	about	
the	moral	status	of	interrupting	aid	in	progress	(106–111).
9.	 Beyond,	of	 course,	 simply	providing	some	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	no	 factors	
other	 than	promoting	 the	 good	 are	 genuinely	 relevant	because	 their	 appar-
ent	relevance	cannot	survive	critical	scrutiny.	But	this	does	not	support	the	
asymmetric	requirement	that	we	must	provide	independent	justifications	of	
In	 this	paper	we	argue	 that	closer	attention	 to	why	 there	are	 rea-
sons	to	promote	good	outcomes	shows	the	top-down	strategy	to	be	
unsound.	We	argue	that	there	are	reasons	to	promote	good	states	be-
cause	 these	are	 states	 it	 is	fitting	 to	desire,	desiring	a	 state	 involves	
motivation	to	promote	it,	and	it	is	a	general	conceptual	truth	that	there	
are	reasons	to	do	what	it	is	fitting	to	be	motivated	to	do.	But,	we	con-
tend,	there	is	every	reason	to	think	that	some	fitting	motives	aim	sim-
ply	at	doing	or	omitting	certain	things,	rather	than	promoting	certain	
states	of	affairs.	Indeed,	we	argue	that	an	act’s	moral	status	consists	in	
the	fittingness	of	 feelings	of	obligation	to	perform	or	avoid	perform-
ing	it,	which	motives	are	in	the	first	instance	directed	at	the	act	rather	
than	the	states	it	brings	about.	Thus,	we	argue,	the	same	connection	
between	fitting	motives	and	reasons	to	act	that	explains	why	there	are	
reasons	to	promote	the	good	directly	explains	why	there	are	reasons	to	
be	moral,	whether or not	being	moral	consists	in	promoting	the	good.	
We	believe	 that	 the	unsoundness	of	 the	 top-down	strategy	 is	 im-
portant,	not	only	because	explicit	uses	of	 the	strategy	have	been	 in-
fluential,	 but	 because	 many	 consequentialist	 arguments	 that	 look	
largely	bottom-up	gain	some	of	their	force	by	tacitly	relying	upon	the	
top-down	strategy.	For	 instance,	many	of	Shelly	Kagan’s	(1989)	argu-
ments	against	non-consequentialist	constraints	on	doing	or	intending	
harm	seek	to	show	that	they	cannot	be	clarified	in	ways	that	comport	
with	the	intuitions	of	those	who	appeal	to	them.6	But	Kagan	goes	on	
to	argue	that	proponents	of	these	constraints	face	a	more	important	
problem,	namely	that	of	justifying	them	or	explaining why	such	factors	
as	doing	or	intending	harm	should	be	so	important.	Kagan	does	not	
present	the	alleged	need	to	independently	justify	non-consequential-
ist	constraints	as	embodying	any	grandiose	theory	about	 the	nature	
of	practical	reasons;	he	supports	it	by	arguing	that	the	mere	fact	that	
a	moral	theory	fits	our	intuitions	about	what	to	do	in	particular	cases	
judgments	why	we	think	TCR	and	even	relativized	consequentialism	can	be	
roughly	put	in	these	terms).
6.	 See	especially	Kagan	1989,	87–111	and	128–165.
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moral	 reasons	 against	 any	 acts	 save	 those	 that	 fail	 to	minimize	 the	
extent	 to	which	undesirable	 things	happen	 in	 the	world.	 (The	kind	
of	concern	that	Nozick	and	Scheffler	are	expressing	is	sometimes	re-
ferred	 to	as	 the	 “paradox	of	deontology”.)	To	 take	one	 last	 example,	
Alastair	Norcross	(2003)	offers	several	compelling	arguments	that	the	
direct	plausibility	of	an	intrinsic	moral	difference	between	something	
like	doing	and	allowing	harm	or	negative	rights	against	interference	
and	positive	rights	to	aid	cannot	withstand	scrutiny.	But	he	goes	on	to	
claim	that,	even	conceding	the	unchallenged	plausibility	of	the	view	
that	negative	rights	are	weightier	than	positive	rights,	“we	also	need	
an	explanation	of	…	why	[negative	rights	are]	stronger	than	[positive	
rights]”.10	Yet	Norcross	does	not	seem	to	think	that	we	need	any	similar	
explanation	of	why	we	morally	ought	 to	promote	 the	good	or	mini-
mize	harm,	evidently	because	he	is	mystified	by	moral	reasons	to	do	
anything	other	than	promote	the	good.
Why,	then,	are	so	many	philosophers	mystified	by	the	idea	of	moral	
reasons	to	do	anything	other	than	promote	the	good?	We	think	that	it	
is	a	tacit	sense	that	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good	are	supported	
by	the	top-down	strategy’s	assertion	that	morality	should	provide	us	
with	genuine	reasons	to	act,	and	that	the	promotion	of	good	outcomes	
is	the	only	sufficiently	moral-looking	thing	that	has	a	clear	theoretical	
purchase	on	our	reasons	for	action.
Our	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	show	that	the	top-down	strategy	fails,	but	
that	it	is	motivated	by	genuine	connections	among	ethical	evaluations,	
fitting	motives,	and	reasons	to	act.	Some	authors	have	held	that	 the	
very	concept	of	a	good	state	of	affairs	employed	by	consequentialists	
10.	Norcross	2003,	457–458.	Like	Kagan,	Scheffler,	 and	many	others,	Norcross	
speaks	of	an	intrinsic	moral	distinction	between	negative	and	positive	rights	
as	having	a	great	deal	of	“intuitive	support”,	which	is	unfortunately	ambigu-
ous	between	 (i)	our	having	 intuitions	about	 cases	 that	would	be	 captured	
by	the	distinction,	and	(ii)	its	being	plausible	in	the	abstract	that	there	is	an	
intrinsic	moral	 distinction	of	 this	 kind.	But	 context	 suggests	 that	Norcross	
intends	ii	(perhaps	in	addition	to	i);	for	instance,	he	concedes	the	plausibility	
of	a	claim	the content of which	asserts	the	relative	priority	of	the	rights,	namely,	
“My	right	not	to	be	poisoned	does	seem	stronger	than	my	right,	if	any,	to	be	
given	the	food	I	need	to	survive”	(457).	
What	makes	Kagan’s	 inability	 to	 find	 successful	 plausibility-inde-
pendent	arguments	in	favor	of	non-consequentialist	constraints	look	
more	 like	 an	 argument	 for	 consequentialism	 than	 a	 skeptical	 chal-
lenge	to	our	justification	for	holding	any	moral	beliefs?	It	is,	we	think,	
the	following	common	background	assumption:
Mystification:	It	is	clear	and	obvious	that	there	is	moral	
reason	to	bring	about	the	good,	but	mysterious	how	there	
could	be	moral	reason	to	do	anything	else.
We	 think	 that	 quite	 a	 few	 arguments	 against	 non-consequentialist	
principles	tacitly	rely	on	the	mystification	assumption.	Phillip	Pettit’s	
(1991)	confident	pronouncement	that	all	moral	theories	must	start	by	
specifying	what	is	good	and	then	exhaust	themselves	by	saying	how	
we	should	relate	to	the	good	would	seem	entirely	question-begging	
were	it	not	that	the	good	seemed	to	have	a	kind	of	unparalleled	moral	
relevance.	Similarly,	the	suggestion	of	Samuel	Scheffler	(1994,	follow-
ing	Robert	Nozick	1974)	that	there	is	an	“apparent	air	of	irrationality	
surrounding	 the	 claim	 that	 some	acts	are	 so	objectionable	 that	one	
ought	not	to	perform	them	even	if	this	means	that	more	equally	weighty	
acts	of	the	very	same	kind	or	other	comparably	objectionable	events	
ensue”	 (82)	 clearly	 seems	 to	presuppose	 the	 incomprehensibility	 of	
non-consequentialist	constraints	even if their plausibility withstood scrutiny	but	
no	similar	independent	justifications	of	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good.	
Kagan	 is	 right	 that	 his	 stated	 aim	 of	 engaging	with	 non-consequentialists	
whom	he	sees	as	already	committed	to	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good	
relieves	 him	 of	 the	 need	 to	 provide	 an	 independent	 justification	 of	 these	
reasons	 (17–19).	 But	 he	 is	wrong	 to	 think	 that	 the	 ad	 hominem	nature	 of	
his	arguments	entitles	him	to	use	the	inability	of	his	opponents	to	provide	
plausibility-independent	 justifications	 of	 non-consequentialist	 constraints	
as	 an	 argument	 against	 them	 without	 providing	 plausibility-independent	
justifications	of	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good.	This	is	because	(a)	the	
demand	for	such	justifications	may	be	entirely	illegitimate,	and	(b)	even	if	it	
is	legitimate,	we	have	no	plausibility-independent	reason	to	think	that	it	will	
be	more	difficult	to	give	these	exalted	justifications	for	non-consequentialist	
constraints	than	it	will	be	to	give	them	for	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good,	
once	we	see	what	on	earth	these	justifications	are	and	how	they	can	be	given	
for	anything.
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outcomes	and	non-moral	reasons	more	generally,	like	indirect	conse-
quentialism	and	contractualism.12 
If	our	argument	is	successful,	we	believe	that	it	removes	an	impor-
tant	 source	of	 support	 for	 consequentialism.	Since,	as	we	have	 indi-
cated,	many	bottom-up	arguments	for	consequentialism	seem	to	rely	
tacitly	on	the	top-down	strategy,	we	think	its	elimination	significantly	
weakens	the	bottom-up	case	for	consequentialism	as	well.	At	the	very	
least,	we	 think	 that	 it	 forces	 consequentialists	 to	demonstrate	more	
directly	why	non-consequentialist	principles	are	implausible	without	
12.	 What	is	most	central	to	our	argument	is	the	existence	of	the	following	connec-
tions	between	ethical	categories,	fitting	attitudes,	and	reasons	to	act:
(1)	 If	 something	 (e. g.	 state	S	 or	 act	A)	 falls	 under	 an	 ethical	 category	 (e. g.	
goodness	or	moral wrongness),	then	it	is	fitting	to	have	a	certain	motivation	
towards	it	(e. g.	to	promote	S	or	avoid	performing	A),	and	
(2)	If	a	motivation	(e. g.	to	promote	S	or	avoid	performing	A)	is	fitting,	then	
there	is	reason	to	act	as	it	would	motivate	us	to	act	(e. g.	to	actually	pro-
mote	S	or	avoid	performing	A).
In	order	to	argue	that	these	connections	exist,	we	defend	particular explana-
tions	as	to	why	they	exist,	namely:
(1*)	Something’s	falling	under	an	ethical	category	(e. g.	S’s	being	good	or	A’s	
being	wrong)	 can be analyzed as	 its	 being	fitting	 to	have	particular	mo-
tivationally	 laden	attitudes	towards	 it	 (like	desires	 that	S	or	 feelings	of	
obligation	not	to	perform	A),	and	
(2*)	What it is for there to be	 reason	to	perform	an	act	(e. g.	 to	promote	S	or	
avoid	performing	A)	is	for	the	act	to	constitute	or	achieve	something	that	
it	is	fitting	to	be	motivated	to	do	or	achieve.
	 We	believe	 that	much	of	 our	 argument	would	 remain	 sound	 if	 alternative	
explanations	of	 (1)	and	 (2)	were	correct	—	for	 instance,	 if	 the	fittingness	of	
attitudes	were	explained	by	the	instantiation	of	ethical	categories,	or	the	fit-
tingness	of	motives	were	explained	by	reasons	to	act.	But	we	argue	in	favor	of	
our	particular	explanations	(1*)	and	(2*)	because	we	believe	that	they	are	the	
best	explanations	of	connections	(1)	and	(2),	and	the	explanations	most	con-
ducive	to	our	argument.	In	notes	21,	34,	and	52	we	explain	how	our	argument	
could	be	made	to	work	if	one	were	to	insist	on	explanations	of	connections	
(1)	and	(2)	other	than	those	we	defend.	We	are	grateful	to	two	anonymous	
readers	 for	Philosophers’ Imprint	 for	pointing	out	and	encouraging	us	 to	dis-
cuss	ways	in	which	our	main	argument	most	centrally	depends	on	(1)	and	(2),	
and	can	remain	sound	even	if	(1*)	and	(2*)	are	mistaken.
is	 either	 incoherent	or	devoid	of	 the	 theoretically	 independent	 con-
nection	to	practical	reasons	presupposed	by	the	top-down	strategy.11 
Against	 these	 authors	we	 show	how	consequentialists’	 talk	of	 good	
states	is	 intelligible,	and	how	there	is	 indeed	a	deep	theoretical	con-
nection	between	 good	 states	 and	 reasons	 to	 act.	 But	we	 argue	 that,	
unfortunately	 for	 the	 top-down	strategy,	once	one	understands	why 
this	connection	holds,	it	becomes	equally	clear	how	there	can	be	rea-
sons	—	indeed	moral	 reasons	—	to	 do	 things	 other	 than	 bring	 about	
good	states.	
In	section	2	we	vindicate	the	intelligibility	and	normative	force	of	
good	states	of	affairs	by	analyzing	them	as	states	it	is	fitting	to	desire,	
and	in	section	3	we	defend	a	conceptual	connection	between	the	fit-
tingness	of	a	motive	and	the	existence	of	reasons	to	perform	the	acts	it	
motivates.	But	while	some	of	our	motives	are	state-directed,	or	motives	
to	bring	about	certain	states	of	affairs,	we	contend	that	we	have	other	
motives	that	are	act-directed,	which	are,	 in	the	first	 instance,	motives	
simply	to	do	certain	things.	In	section	4	we	show	how,	in	the	same	way	
the	fittingness	of	state-directed	motives	generates	reasons	to	promote	
the	good,	the	fittingness	of	act-directed	motives	generates	reasons	to	
do	other	things	that	may	not	promote	the	good.	Moreover,	we	argue	
in	section	5	 that	an	act’s	moral	status	consists	 in	 the	fittingness	of	a	
particular	kind	of	act-directed	motive,	namely	a	feeling	of	obligation	to	
perform	or	avoid	performing	it.	This	means	that	the	same	connection	
between	fitting	motives	 and	 reasons	 to	 act	 that	 explains	why	 there	
are	reasons	to	promote	the	good	equally	explains	the	connection	be-
tween	an	act’s	moral	status	and	reasons	 for	or	against	performing	 it	
quite	independently	of	whether	the	act	promotes	the	good.	This,	we	
contend,	demystifies	how	there	could	be	moral	reasons	to	do	anything	
other	than	promote	the	good.	We	conclude	in	section	6	by	examining	
how	our	argument	may	be	extended	to	undermine	the	motivations	for	
other	theories	that	view	moral	considerations	as	subordinate	to	good	
11.	 See	especially	Taurek	(1977,	304–306),	Foot	(1985,	202–209),	and	Thomson	
(1994,	12–14).
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In	contrast	 to	pragmatic	reasons,	considerations	 like	the	fact	 that	
a	 state	of	affairs	would	 involve	children	being	happy	do	not	 simply	
count	in	favor	of	getting	yourself	to	desire	it	—	they	make	a	desire	for	
it	fitting	or	appropriate.	These	fittingness reasons	to	desire	a	state	that	
constitute	its	being	fitting	to	desire	it	are	the	ones	that	constitute	its	
goodness.	An	analysis	of	the	concept	good	states	of	affairs	into	the	
concept	 reasons	 for	 desire	 should	 thus	 be	 in	 terms	 of	 fittingness,	
rather	than	pragmatic,	reasons.15	Of	course,	if	the	concept	of	a	fitting-
ness	reason	to	desire	a	state	just	was	that	of	a	consideration	that	bears	
on	whether	 the	state	 is	good,	 this	sort	of	analysis	would	be	circular.	
We	think,	however,	that	the	distinction	between	judgments	about	fit-
tingness	as	opposed	to	pragmatic	reasons	for	attitudes	can	be	made	
sense	of	without	 invoking	ethical	 concepts	 like	goodness.16	While	a	
full	account	of	 the	distinction	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	paper,	we	
think	it	can	be	usefully	characterized	by	noting	that	it	is	characteristic	
of	 judgments	 about	 the	 existence	of	 pragmatic	 reasons	 to	have	 atti-
tudes	that	they	are	not	capable	of	directly	guiding	us	into	having	those	
attitudes	without	first	motivating	us	to	do	things	to	make	it	the	case	
that	we	have	them.	To	desire	an	odd	number	of	hairs	on	your	head	in	
response	to	the	reasons	you	take	the	demon’s	threat	to	provide,	you	
must	first	do	something	 like	condition	yourself,	 take	drugs,	or	selec-
tively	attend	to	certain	things	with	the	aim	of	developing	the	desire.	
Judgments	about	 the	existence	of	fittingness	 reasons	 for	an	attitude,	
however,	do	seem	capable	of	directly	guiding	us	into	having	it	without	
having	to	first	motivate	us	to	do	anything	to	get	ourselves	to	have	it.	
For	 instance,	 judging	that	 it	 is	fitting	or	appropriate	to	desire	knowl-
edge	 for	 its	own	sake	—	as	you	might	conclude	upon	contemplating	
reasons	to desire	 it	at	all.	But	whatever	we	want	to	call	them,	the	important	
thing	is	to	distinguish	these	kinds	of	reasons	from	the	reasons	to	desire	the	
state	that	(all	agree)	are	connected	to	the	goodness	of	the	state..
15.	 In	 this	paper,	we	 follow	one	standard	convention	 in	 the	 literature	and	use	
smallcaps	to	designate	concepts.
16.	 For	recent	discussions	of	attempts	to	make	sense	of	the	distinction	without	in-
voking	ethical	categories,	see,	for	instance,	Danielsson	and	Olson	2007,	Lang	
2008,	Way	2012,	and	Schroeder	2012.
assuming	at	the	outset	that	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good	have	a	
uniquely	obvious	rational	sanction	and	demanding	that,	because	non-
consequentialist	principles	do	not	direct	us	to	promote	the	good,	we	
must	give	a	special	kind	of	justification	for	them.
2. Good Outcomes and Fitting Attitudes
To	understand	why	the	goodness	of	a	state	of	affairs	guarantees	the	ex-
istence	of	reasons	to	bring	it	about,	we	must	begin	by	clarifying	what	
it	is	to	judge	that	a	state	of	affairs	is	good.	Such	a	judgment	does	not	
seem	simply	to	describe	the	state.	Rather,	 it	also	seems	to	 involve	a	
normative	 claim	 that	 recommends	 the	state	or	 speaks	 in	 its	 favor.	 In	
particular,	it	seems	to	be	a	claim	to	the	effect	that	the	state	of	affairs	
is	desirable,	or	such	that	we	should	desire	that	it	obtains.	Put	in	terms	
of	reasons,	it	looks	like	we	might	analyze	the	judgment	that	state	of	
affairs	S	is	good	as	one	to	the	effect	that	there	are	sufficient	reasons	to	
desire	that	S	obtains.13
While	we	think	that	this	kind	of	analysis	best	captures	the	content	
and	normative	force	of	judgments	about	good	states	of	affairs,	it	needs	
clarification	and	 refinement	 concerning	both	 the	kind of reasons	 and	
the	kind of desires	it	involves.	Beginning	with	the	first	issue,	there	are	
clearly	some	kinds	of	 reasons	 to	desire	a	state	 that	are	of	 the	wrong 
kind	for	constituting	its	goodness.	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	an	evil	
demon	credibly	threatens	to	harm	your	loved	ones	if	you	do	not	desire	
that	there	be	an	odd	number	of	hairs	on	your	head.	The	fact	that	the	
demon	has	made	this	threat	seems	to	be	a	strong	pragmatic reason	to	
desire,	or	at	least	to	get	yourself	to	desire,	that	you	have	an	odd	num-
ber	of	hairs.	However,	this	would	not	thereby	make	it	good	that	you	
have	an	odd	number	of	hairs.14 
13.	 Where	sufficient	reasons	to	have	attitude	A	are	reasons	that	make	one	justi-
fied	(in	a	sense	we	will	clarify	below),	all-things-considered,	in	having	A.	For	
examples	of	this	basic	kind	of	analysis,	see	Ewing	1939,	Gibbard	1990,	Ander-
son	1993,	and	Scanlon	1998.	
14.	 See	Rabinowicz	and	Rønnow-Rasmussen	2004,	following	Crisp	2000.	Some,	
like	Gibbard	(1990,	36),	Parfit	(2001,	27),	Portmore	(2011,	59),	and	Way	(2012)	
insist	that	these	pragmatic	reasons	to get oneself	to	desire	something	are	not	
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a	desire	for	it.18	Since	the	fittingness	reasons	Jones	shares	with	Smith	
include	only	basic	reasons	of	beneficence	to	care	about	both	children,	
equally	unintensified	by	personal	relationships	to	either,	she	could	not	
truly	claim	that	this	development	was	good	in	talking	to	Smith.
Judgments	 that	a	state	 is	good	thus	seem	to	be	 judgments	 that	a	
desire	for	the	state	is	supported	by	the	fittingness	reasons	one	shares	
with	the	group	one	means	to	be	talking	or	thinking	together	with.	In	
thinking	 about	what	 she	 should	want,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 judge’s	
group	 to	 shrink	 to	herself	 alone.	 It	 is	 also	possible	 for	 the	 judge	 to	
address	or	think	on	behalf	of	the	widest	group	of	agents	with	whom	
she	 shares	fittingness	 reasons	 to	desire	 states.	We	 think	 that	 this	 is	
the	kind	of	 context	 in	which	 thinking	about	basic	moral	 reasons	of	
beneficence	—	to	which	all	morality	reduces,	on	some	consequential-
ist	views	—	takes	place.	To	judge	in	this	context	that	one	state	is	better	
than	another	is	to	judge	that	the	fittingness	reasons	one	shares	with	all	
moral	agents	favor	preferring	it.19
This	analysis	of	judgments	about	good	states	as	judgments	about	
our	shared	fittingness	reasons	for	desire	can	defend	talk	about	mor-
ally	good	states	from	the	charges	of	incoherence	or	contentlessness	
levelled	by	Taurek,	Foot,	and	Thomson.	In	asking	someone	to	agree	
that	it	would	be	better	if	five	others	survived	instead	of	her,	we	are	not,	
as	Taurek	(1977,	305)	suggested,	claiming	that	she	should,	all	things	
considered,	prefer	the	survival	of	the	five.	We	are	merely	asking	her	to	
agree	that	the	fittingness	reasons	she shares with the five	(and	the	rest	
of	us)	favor	preferring	their	survival.	Moreover,	to	claim	in	a	universal	
18.	 To	say	that	a	response	is	supported	on	balance	by	a	set	of	reasons	is	to	say	
that	there	is	no	alternative	response	that	those	reasons	favor	more	strongly.	
19.	 This	 contextualist	 account	 thus	 provides	 a	 solution	 to	 “the	 Partiality	Chal-
lenge”	as	to	how	we	can	analyze	judgments	about	good	states	as	judgments	
about	fitting	attitudes	 if	 Jones	can	 judge	 it	fitting	 for	her	 to	prefer	 that	 the	
kidney	be	transplanted	into	her	child	without	thinking	(in	certain	contexts)	
that	this	state	is	better	(Ewing	1939,	19,	and	Blanshard	1961,	287–288).	The	so-
lution	is	similar	to	Suikkanen’s	(2009),	but	it	is	more	flexible	in	that	it	makes	
sense	of	non-relativized	evaluative	judgments	in	non-fully-impartial	contexts,	
and	it	avoids	the	objections	raised	by	Zimmerman	(2011,	458–460)	about	cir-
cularity	and	indeterminacy.
Nozick’s	(1974,	42–45)	experience	machine	—	seems	like	it	can	directly	
cause	you	to	desire	knowledge	intrinsically.
If	we	are	 to	analyze	 judgments	 about	 a	 state’s	 goodness	as	 judg-
ments	 that	 there	 are	 sufficient	fittingness	 reasons	 to	desire	 it,	 there	
remains	a	question	as	to	whose	reasons	these	are	supposed	to	be.	For	
instance,	 if	 both	 Jones’s	 child	 and	Smith’s	 child	 are	dying	of	 kidney	
failure,	and	there	is	only	one	kidney	available	for	transplant,	it	seems	
fitting	for	 Jones	to	desire	 the	state	of	 its	being	transplanted	 into	her	
child,	but	fitting	for	Smith	to	desire	an	alternative	state	of	the	kidney	
being	transplanted	into	her	child.
We	 think	 that	 the	 answer	 as	 to	whose	fittingness	 reasons	one	 is	
talking	about	when	one	claims	that	a	state	is	good	is	a	contextualist	
one,	the	essentials	of	which	have	been	suggested	by	Foot	(1985),	Hur-
ka	(1987),	Lewis	(1989),	and	Gibbard	(1998).	Clearly,	when	someone	
judges	a	state	of	affairs	good,	she	ordinarily	takes	there	to	be	fitting-
ness	reasons	for	her	to	desire	it;	the	main	question	is	who	else’s	fitting-
ness	reasons	she	is	making	a	commitment	about.17	Judgments	that	a	
state	is	good	don’t	always	seem	to	commit	the	judge	to	thinking	that	
everyone	has	most	fittingness	reason	to	desire	it.	Surely	Jones	could	
truly	say	to	her	partner	that	their	child’s	being	moved	ahead	of	Smith’s	
child	on	the	kidney	waiting	list	was	a	good	thing	without	being	com-
mitted	to	thinking	that	it	would	be	fitting	for	Smith	to	desire	it.	When	
Jones	speaks	to	her	partner	about	this	being	a	good	development,	she	
seems	to	mean	that	the fittingness reasons they share	support,	on	balance,	
17.	 In	certain	contexts,	such	as	those	of	giving	advice,	one	might	call	states	good	
that	 one	does	not	 take	oneself	 to	have	fittingness	 reason	 to	desire.	 For	 in-
stance,	in	advising	a	rival	in	a	competition,	one	might	refer	to	states	that	tend	
towards	her	winning	as	“good”,	although	one	takes	it	to	be	unfitting	for	one	to	
desire	them	oneself.	One	possibility	is	that,	in	giving	such	advice,	the	advisor	
takes	on	the	false	presupposition	that	there	is	reason	for	her	to	share	the	advi-
see’s	aims,	and,	given	this,	the	advisor	does	in	fact	take	there	to	be	fittingness	
reasons	for	her	to	desire	the	states	she	calls	“good”.	But	another	possibility	is	
that,	although	the	judge	is	almost	always	part	of	the	audience	she	means	to	
be	addressing	with	talk	about	goodness,	this	fails	to	be	true	in	special	cases.	
Since	the	judge	is	clearly	part	of	the	audience	in	the	contexts	we	will	be	con-
sidering,	it	will	not	matter	for	our	purposes	which	account	is	correct.	
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Having	clarified	the	kind	of	reasons	involved	in	our	analysis,	we	now	
turn	to	the	kind	of	attitude	that	judgments	of	a	state’s	goodness	take	
them	to	be	reasons	for.	We	characterized	these	roughly	as	reasons	to	
desire	that	the	state	obtains,	but	this	might	seem	too	narrow.	It	can	
be	 awkward	 to	 speak	 of	 someone	 desiring	 states	 that	 currently	 ob-
tain,	that	obtained	in	the	past,	or	that	are	impossible	for	her	to	bring	
about,	although	she	can	of	course	judge	(and	judge	truly)	that	current,	
past,	and	infeasible	states	are	good.	It	is	less	awkward	to	say	that	we	
are	glad	that	certain	past	and	present	states	obtain	and	that	we	hope 
or wish	that	certain	infeasible	states	will,	and	the	thought	that	these	
responses	are	fitting	seems	to	be	what	is	involved	in	thinking	them	
good.	What	being	glad,	hoping,	and	wishing	that	a	state	obtains	have	
in	common	with	desiring	that	 it	does	is	that	they	are	“pro-attitudes”	
that	involve	an	attraction	to	the	state,	which	includes	motivation	to	
bring	it	about	if	one	can,	tendencies	to	find	it	appealing	or	pleasurable	
to	think	about,	and	tendencies	to	direct	one’s	attention	towards	it	and	
ways	it	might	be	realized.22
While	some	philosophers	like	to	speak	of	every	motivation	and	pro-
attitude	as	directed	at	a	state	of	affairs,	we	do	not	think	that	this	is	right.	
Consider	the	contrast	involved	in	the	following	pairs	of	attitudes:
1.	wanting	to	yell	at	someone	in	a	fit	of	anger	vs.	wanting	it	to	
be	 true	 that	one	has	yelled	at	him	so	he	doesn’t	walk	all	
over	you,	
2.	an	aversion	to	killing	someone	vs.	an	aversion	to	there	being	
killings	in	the	world,	and	
3.	wanting	to	exercise	now	vs.	wanting	the	world	to	be	such	that	
one	exercises	now.
A’s	perspective”,	which	might	be	rather	unclear	(see	e. g.	Schroeder	2007	and	
Portmore	 2011,	 62).	 By	 taking	 the	 concept	 of	 a	fittingness	 reason	 to	be	 ex-
planatorily	prior	to	that	of	a	good	state,	we	avoid	such	problematic	reliance	
on	unexplained	notions	of	perspective-relative	goodness.
22.	 For	this	sort	of	characterization	of	pro-attitudes,	particularly	in	the	context	of	
desire,	see	Darwall	1983,	40–41;	Scanlon	1998,	39;	and	Portmore	2011,	64–65.
context	that	state	S	 is	good	is	not	simply	to	say,	as	Foot	(1985,	202–
204)	and	Thomson	(1994,	12–14)	suggest,	that	S	has	some	particular	
property	that	one	thinks	we	should	promote.	It	is	to	make	a	substan-
tive	 claim	about	what	preferences	among	states	are	 favored	by	 the	
fittingness	reasons	we	all	share,	which	can	be	meaningfully	debated.20 
Without	such	a	fitting	attitude	analysis,	it	would	be	unclear	what	talk	
about	morally	good	states	could	amount	to,	but	with	the	analysis	 it	
becomes	clear	how	this	 talk	 is	of	a	piece	with	our	other	 judgments	
about	good	states.21
20.	We	think	many	major	debates	 in	normative	ethics	concern	what	 these	rea-
sons	for	preference	support,	including	questions	of	what	well-being	consists	
in	or	which	states	we	should	prefer	out	of	concern	for	a	given	individual	(Dar-
wall	2002);	whether	we	should	sometimes	prefer	lesser	gains	for	some	indi-
viduals	 to	greater	gains	 for	other	 individuals	 in	 the	name	of	equality	(Tem-
kin	2003),	priority	(Parfit	1997),	or	sufficiency	(Crisp	2006);	and	whether	we	
should	prefer	more	 individuals	 to	exist	 simply	because	 there	will	be	more	
well-being	in	the	world	(Singer	1979).	
	 	 This	said,	there	is	a	way	in	which	we	agree	with	some	of	Foot’s	(1985,	204–
206)	argument	that	moral	reasons	to	promote	morally	good	states	must	come	
from	within,	rather	than	outside	of,	morality,	and	that	this	makes	trouble	for	
what	we	are	calling	the	top-down	strategy	of	arguing	for	consequentialism.	
But,	as	we	will	argue	in	the	next	section,	good	states	have	a	direct	connection	
to	practical	 reasons,	which	holds	 independently	of	any	general	connection	
between	morality	and	practical	reasons.	We	think	this	is	exactly	the	sort	of	
connection	that	the	top-down	strategy	presupposes,	and	it	does	not,	pace	Foot,	
rely	on	any	thoughts	about	what	would	be	morally	virtuous.
21.	 This	is	one	reason	why,	although	it	is	the	existence	of	a	connection	between	
S’s	goodness	and	there	being	fittingness	reasons	to	desire	S	that	is	most	cen-
tral	to	our	argument,	we	think	our	particular	explanation	of	this	connection	
is	most	germane	to	our	argument.	Suppose,	for	instance,	that	fittingness	rea-
sons	to	desire	S	could	not	be	understood	independently	of	S’s	goodness	(say,	
because	what	explained	R’s	status	as	a	fittingness	as	opposed	to	a	pragmatic	
reason	to	desire	S	was	that	R	bears	on	S’s	goodness).	We	could	still	give	some-
thing	like	the	foregoing	contextualist	account	of	judgments	about	S’s	good-
ness,	but	it	would	have	to	be	more	like	the	following:	(i)	the	judgment	that	
S	is	good,	when	made	in	context	X,	has	as	its	content	the	proposition	that	S 
is good relative to X,	(ii)	S’s	being	good	relative	to	X	entails	that	the	fittingness	
reasons	shared	by	the	agents	addressed	in	context	X	support	on	balance	de-
siring	X,	and	(iii)	the	judgment	that	R	 is	a	fittingness	reason	for	agent	A	to	
desire	S	 is	true	just	in	case	R	bears	on	S’s	being	good	relative	to	XA,	where	
XA	 is	 something	 like	 “A’s	 perspective.”.	While	we	 think	 that	our	basic	 argu-
ment	 could	be	made	using	 this	 alternative	 contextualist	 account,	 it	would	
have	to	take	as	basic	and	unanalyzed	the	idea	of	“goodness	relative	to	agent	
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things	 (like	 take	 inhibition-lowering	or	anger-enhancing	pills)	 in	or-
der	to	cause	himself	to	yell	at	the	associate.	
Thus,	it	seems	that	motivations	to	bring	about	states	play	the	role	
of	generating	motivations	to	do	things	that	are	represented	as	bring-
ing	them	about,	while	these	motivations	to	do	things	(which	may	or	
may	not	be	generated	by	motives	to	bring	about	states)	play	the	role	
of	generating	motives	to	do	more	specific	things	that	are	represented	
as	ways	of	doing	the	more	general	thing.	While	state-directed	motives	
play	the	role	of	relating	our	intentional	actions	to	states	of	the	world,	
act-directed	motives	play	the	role	of	relating	our	more	specific	or	local	
intentional	actions	to	our	more	general	or	global	intentional	actions.25 
Consequently,	 we	 think	 that	 we	 can	 understand	 the	 distinction	 be-
tween	act-directed	and	state-directed	motives	in	terms	of	the	follow-
ing	functional	differences:	
M	is	an	act-directed motive	directed	towards	act	A	iff	M 
plays	 the	 role	 of	 combining	 with	 representations	 that	
<φ-ing	is	(or	is	not)	part	of	a	way	of	doing	A>26 to	explain	
φ-ing,27	while
25.	 For	 a	 sustained	 discussion	 of	 how	 particular	 kinds	 of	 act-directed	 mo-
tives	—	namely	plans	or	intentions	—	do	this,	see	Bratman	1987.
26.	By	a	“representation	that	<φ-ing	is	(or	is	not)	part	of	a	way	of	doing	A>”,	we	
mean	something	a	bit	broader	than	a	representation	that	φ-ing	actually	con-
stitutes	doing	A.	For	instance,	an	act-directed	motive	to	yell	at	someone	will	
motivate	you	not	only	to	do	things	that	you	think	will	constitute	yelling,	but	
to	do	things	like	storming	into	the	room	next	door	where	you	think	she	is	
located	in	order	to	yell	at	her.	While	you	presumably	don’t	represent	storm-
ing	 into	 the	 room	as	part	of	 the	act	of	 yelling	 itself,	 the	way	 in	which	 the	
act-directed	motive	to	yell	gives	rise	to	this	motivation	seems	importantly	dif-
ferent	from	the	way	in	which	a	state-directed	motive	to	bring	it	about	that	you	
yell	can	give	rise	to	the	motivation	to	take	anger-inducing	pills	so	as	to	cause	
yourself	to	yell.	What	we	have	in	mind	here	is	something	like	a	generalization	
of	the	way	an	intention	to	A	gives	rise	to	more	particular	“intentions	in	action”,	
or	intentions	to	φ	and	thereby	do	A	(as	opposed	to	simply	the	way	a	desire	
for	S	gives	rise	to	intentions	to	do	A and	thereby	bring	about	S,	even	if	S	is	a	
state	involving	one’s	performing	certain	intentional	actions).	For	a	review	of	
literature	on	intention	in	action,	see	Wilson	and	Shpall	2012.
27.	While	we	speak	of	act-directed	motives	to	do	A	combining	with	representa-
tions	that	φ-ing	is	a	way	of	doing	A	to	explain	φ-ing,	one	might	worry	whether	
Intuitively,	the	second	attitude	in	each	pair	does take	a	state	of	affairs	
(one’s	having	yelled,	there	being	killings,	one’s	exercising	now)	as	its	
object.	But	 the	first	attitude	 in	each	pair	 looks	different;	 it	 seems	 to	
take	a	particular	act	(yelling,	killing	someone,	exercising)	as	its	object.
So	says	intuition,	but	why	not	simply	treat	the	first	attitude	in	each	
pair	as	a	disguised	motive	to	bring	about	a	state	of	affairs,	like	“my	yell-
ing	at	him	now”	or	“my	exercising	now”?23	We	think	that	state-directed	
and	act-directed	motives	actually	play	rather	distinct	functional	roles,	
which	 explain	 different	 aspects	 of	 cognition	 and	 behavior.	 A	 state-
directed	motive	 to	bring	 it	 about	 that	 one	does	A	 now	will	 explain	
both	more	and	less	than	an	act-directed	motive	to	do	A.	For	instance,	a	
meek	person	averse	to	confrontation	might	have	a	strong	state-direct-
ed	motive	to	bring	it	about	that	he	yells	at	a	bully	to	get	the	bully	to	
stop	bullying	him,	but	be	unable	to	summon	any	act-directed	motiva-
tion	to	yell	at	the	bully.	In	such	a	case	the	state-directed	motive	will	not	
by	itself	motivate	the	meek	person	to	yell,	but	it	will	motivate	him	to	
do	things	that	he	hopes	will	cause	him	to	yell,	like	ingest	substances	
that	 he	 hopes	will	 lower	 his	 inhibitions,	 direct	 his	 attention	 to	 con-
siderations	 that	might	make	him	angry,	or	 take	anger-inducing	pills	
if	he	has	them	ready	to	hand.24	On	the	other	hand,	a	customer	who	is	
angry	with	an	online	sales	associate	might	have	a	strong	act-directed	
motive	to	yell	at	the	associate	but	think	the	anger	is	unwarranted	and	
have	no	state-directed	motive	to	bring	it	about	that	he	yells	at	the	as-
sociate.	While	 the	 act-directed	motive	will	motivate	 yelling	 and	 the	
various	sub-actions	that	the	customer	takes	to	be	ways	of	yelling	(like	
moving	his	fingers	in	ways	he	takes	to	be	the	typing	of	angry	messages	
the	associate	will	see	—	which	might	not	work	if	the	Internet	connec-
tion	has	gone	down),	it	will	not	by	itself	motivate	the	customer	to	do	
23.	 See	Portmore	2011,	56.
24.	Of	 course,	 under	happier	 circumstances,	 the	meek	person’s	motivation	 to	
bring	 it	 about	 that	 he	 yells	 would	 directly	 engender	 a	 motivation	 to yell, 
which	would	motivate	yelling.	What	we	illustrate	is	the	causal	work	that	the	
motive	to	bring	it	about	that	one	yells	can	do	even	when	it	fails	to	give	rise	
to	a	motivation	to	yell	 (which	serves	our	aim	of	 illustrating	their	different	
functional	roles).
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M	 is	a	state-directed motive	directed	 towards	state	S	 iff	
M	plays	the	role	of	combining	with	representations	that	
<A-ing	will	bring	about	(or	prevent)	S>	to	explain	act-di-
rected	motives	to	do	(or	avoid	doing)	A.	
We	will	 call	 pro-attitudes	 that	 are	 in	 the	first	 instance	attractions	 to	
states,	which	include	state-directed	motives	to	bring	them	about	if	one	
can,	state-directed pro-attitudes.	We	will	call	pro-attitudes	that	are	in	the	
first	instance	attractions	to	performing	particular	acts,	which	include	
act-directed	motives	to	perform	them,	act-directed pro-attitudes.
Having	clarified	this	much,	we	can	state	our	proposed	analysis	of	
the	concept	good	state	of	affairs:
Fitting Attitude Analysis of Good States:	To	judge	that	
state	of	 affairs S is	 good	 is	 to	 judge	 that	 the	fittingness	
reasons	 one	 shares	with	 a	 contextually	 specified	 set	 of	
agents,	Gx,	 support	 on	 balance	 a	 state-directed	 pro-atti-
tude	towards	S.28
of	both	cognitively	less	sophisticated	and	cognitively	more	sophisticated	in-
dividuals	may	depend	holistically	on	the	networks	of	beliefs	they	happen	to	
have	 and	 be	 largely	 a	matter	 of	 degree	 (150–155).	We	believe	 that	 similar	
arguments	can	be	made	to	support	attributions	of	representations	of	the	rel-
evant	 kind	 of	 constitution	 to	 all	motive-capable	 human	 children	 and	 non-
human	animals;	we	suspect	that	representations	of	the	sort	of	constitution	
we	have	in	mind	are	implicit	not	only	in	the	general	psychology	of	learning,	
but	in	particular	in	the	functional	roles	that	hierarchical	action	schemas	are	
invoked	to	explain	(see	for	instance	Cooper	and	Shallice	2000	and	Grafton	
and	Hamilton	2007).
	 	 We	are	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reader	for	Philosophers’ Imprint	for	raising	
these	issues	and	pointing	out	other	problems	with	our	account	of	the	distinc-
tion	between	act-directed	and	state-directed	motives	in	an	earlier	draft.	
28.	This	analysis	leaves	open	a	second	way	in	which	the	truth	conditions	of	judg-
ments	about	good	states	depend	on	context,	namely	upon	which	alternatives	
to	the	state	are	relevant.	Suppose	that	one	of	three	mutually	exclusive	things	
might	happen	to	the	Jones’s	child:	(n)	she	receives	no	kidney	transplant	and	
dies	soon,	(t)	she	receives	a	transplant	but	must	take	anti-rejection	drugs	and	
may	have	a	shorter-than-average	life,	or	(b)	a	medical	breakthrough	occurs	
which	restores	her	own	kidneys’	functioning,	ensuring	a	fully	normal	life.	In	
a	context	where	(n)	was	the	relevant	alternative	to	(t),	the	Joneses	could	truly	
judge	that	(t)	is	good,	but	in	a	context	where	(b)	was	the	relevant	alternative	
this	is	so	in	the	case	of	basic	actions,	or	actions	one	can	perform	directly	and	
without	performing	any	other	intentional	action.	The	analysis	could	be	said	
to	apply	to	basic	actions	because	if	A	is	a	basic	action,	then	an	act-directed	
motive	 to	do	A	 combines	with	 a	 representation	 that	 <doing	A	 is	 a	way	of	
doing	A>	to	cause	one	to	do	A.	While	 this	might	appear	artificial,	 this	sort	
of	application	of	the	account	might	plausibly	explain	why	individuals	fail	to	
perform	basic	actions	that	they	want	to	perform	if	they	don’t	know	that	they	
can	perform	them	(e. g.	if	you	want	to	move	your	arm,	which	has	been	para-
lyzed,	and	unbeknownst	to	you	your	basic	ability	to	move	your	arm	has	just	
been	restored,	you	may	not	move	your	arm,	because	you	fail	to	represent	to	
yourself	that	moving	your	arm	is	a	way	of	moving	your	arm).	Alternatively,	
one	might	say	that	the	analysis	we	give	in	the	text	is	correct	so	long	as	A	is	a	
non-basic	action,	but	that	if	A	is	a	basic	action,	the	functional	role	of	a	motive	
to	do	A	is	simply	to	cause	one	to	do	A,	all	on	its	own	and	without	any	repre-
sentations.	Either	way,	we	think	that	we	will	have	no	more	difficulty	account-
ing	for	motives	to	perform	basic	actions	than	those	who	reject	act-directed	
motives	and	insist	that	all	motives	are	motives	to	bring	about	some	state	S, 
which	play	the	role	of	combining	with	representations	that	φ-ing	will	bring	
about	S	to	explain	φ-ing.	Proponents	of	this	teleological	theory	of	motivation	
must	treat	motives	to	bring	it	about	that	you	perform	basic	action	A	as	either	
(i)	combining	with	a	representation	that	your	performing	A	will	bring	it	about	
that	you	perform	A,	which	might	seem	artificial,	or	(ii)	unlike	other	motives	
in	that	they	are	capable	of	causing	one	to	do	A	all	by	themselves	and	without	
any	additional	representational	states.
	 	 Another	worry	one	might	have	about	our	claim	that	act-directed	motives	
to	do	A	combine	with	representations	that	φ-ing	is	a	way	of	doing	A	 to	ex-
plain	φ-ing	 is	 that	such	representations	might	seem	too	cognitively	sophis-
ticated	to	be	necessary	 for	an	 individual	 to	have	act-directed	motives	(and	
state-directed	motives	—	since	our	analysis	 explains	 these	 in	 terms	of	 their	
tendencies	to	give	rise	to	act-directed	motives).	Young	human	children	and	
many	non-human	animals	are	surely	capable	of	motivations	to	do	things,	but	
they	might	seem	to	lack	the	concept	of	one	action’s	constituting	a	way	of	per-
forming	another.	We	believe,	however,	that	we	face	no	more	difficulty	here	
than	proponents	of	teleological	theories	of	motivation,	since	it	seems	just	as	
problematic	to	attribute	the	concept	of	an	act’s	causing	or	bringing	about	a	
state	of	affairs	to	many	motive-capable	children	and	non-human	animals.	To	
explain	how	we	can	attribute	such	representations	of	constitution	and	causa-
tion	to	these	individuals,	we	can	argue	that	(i)	the	representations	are	implicit	
or	de re,	(ii)	the	required	concepts	of	constitution	and	causation	need	not	be	
as	cognitively	sophisticated	as	ours,	or	(iii)	we	overestimate	the	differences	
between	our	conceptualization	of	constitution	and	causation	and	theirs	(per-
haps	because	we	confuse	our	thoughts	about	constitution	and	causation	with	
meta-cognitive	 reflection	or	access	 to	our	 thoughts	about	constitution	and	
causation).	 For	 example,	 Dretske	 (1988)	 argues	 that	 discriminative	 instru-
mental	conditioning	involves	implicit	representations	of	the	relevant	kind	of	
causation	(109–122),	observational	learning	involves	explicit	representations	
of	such	causation	(137–150),	and	differences	in	the	thinking	about	causation	
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if	 someone	were	 to	 label	 as	 “good”	 precisely	 those	 states	we	 think	
bad,	we	 think	 she	would	 be	 perfectly	 intelligible	 as	 thinking	 them	
good	so	long	as	she	thought	it	was	fitting	to	desire	these	states.	That	
said,	this	fairly	strong	claim	—	that	judgments	that	it	is	fitting	to	have	
pro-attitudes	towards	a	state	exhaust	 the	content	of	 judgments	that	
it	is	good	—	could	actually	be	weakened	for	our	purposes	here.30	All	
we	will	rely	on	below	is	the	claim	that	judgments	about	the	relevant	
fittingness	reasons	are	entailed	by	or	part	of	the	content	of	judgments	
that	a	state	is	good.
3. Fitting Attitudes and Reasons to Act
We	have	thus	argued	that	to	judge	a	state	good	is	to	judge	that	there	
are	fittingness	reasons	that	on	balance	favor	our	having	a	pro-attitude	
towards	it.	Since	a	judgment’s	truth	entails	the	truth	of	its	analysans,	
this	means	that	it	is	a	conceptual	truth	that	a	state	of	affairs	is	good	iff	
there are	 fittingness	 reasons	 that	 on	 balance	 favor	 our	 having	 a	 pro-
attitude	 towards	 it.31	We	will	 now	 argue	 that	 this	 analysis,	 together	
with	general	facts	about	the	relationship	between	fitting	attitudes	and	
reasons	to	act,	explains	why	a	state’s	goodness	entails	the	existence	of	
reasons	to	bring	it	about.	
The	basic	idea	here	is	that	what	there	is	reason	for	us	to	do	is	deter-
mined	by	what	aims	there	is	reason	for	us	to	have	(together,	of	course,	
with	 descriptive	 facts	 about	what	will	 achieve	 these	 aims),	 and	 the	
30.	One	might,	for	instance,	think	that	judgments	about	what’s	good	involve	cer-
tain	substantive	platitudes	or	normative	presuppositions	about	the	sorts	of	
things	 that	 can	 count.	 See	 Foot	 1959,	 85,	 and	discussion	by	Gibbard	 2003,	
142–178.
31.	 Compare:	if	judging	someone	to	be	a	bachelor	amounts	to	judging	him	to	be	
a	male	who	isn’t	in	a	romantic	relationship	but	in	a	position	to	enter	one,	then	
it’s	a	conceptual	truth	that	someone	is	a	bachelor	iff	he’s	a	male	who	isn’t	in	a	
romantic	relationship	but	in	a	position	to	enter	one.	Because	analyses	of	one	
kind	of	judgment	into	another	in	this	way	support	analytic	relationships	be-
tween	the	facts	the	judgments	represent,	we	will	slide	rather	freely	between	
talking	about	what	it	is	to	make	a	certain	kind	of	judgment	(“to	judge	a	state	
good	is	to	judge	it	fitting	to	have	a	pro-attitude	towards	it”)	and	talking	about	
the	analytic	relationships	between	the	facts	they	represent	(“it’s	a	conceptual	
truth	that	a	state	is	good	iff	it’s	fitting	to	have	a	pro-attitude	towards	it”).
We	believe	that	this	analysis	has	a	number	of	important	strengths.	The	
first	 is	 its	ability	to	explain	the	diversity	of	conceptually	coherent	(if	
often	badly	mistaken)	views	that	people	can	have	about	what	states	
are	good,	ranging	from	the	judgment	that	the	preservation	of	natural	
beauty	is	good	to	the	judgment	that	a	race’s	staying	“pure”	is	good.	Our	
analysis	explains	what	is	common	to	all	such	judgments,	namely	that	
those	who	make	them	think	we	should	have	pro-attitudes	towards	the	
states	in	question.	A	second	strength	of	our	analysis	is	its	ability	to	cap-
ture	the	normative	and	motivational	force	of	judgments	about	which	
states	are	good.	To	call	state	S	good	is	to	recommend	S	or	speak	in	S’s	
favor,	which	we	think	is	best	captured	by	the	claim	that	it	is	fitting	for	
us	to	have	pro-attitudes	towards	S.	The	analysis	also	explains	the	abil-
ity	of	judgments	that	states	are	good	to	motivate	us	to	pursue	them	as	
a	special	case	of	 the	ability	of	 judgments	that	attitudes	are	fitting	to	
directly	guide	us	into	having	them.29
To	appreciate	how	central	these	features	are	to	judgments	about	
good	outcomes,	suppose	that	someone	used	the	word	‘good’	to	label	
all	 those	 states	we	 call	 good,	 but	 took	 this	 to	 have	no	 significance	
for	what	 it	was	appropriate	 to	desire	and	consequently	had	no	pro-
pensity	to	desire	the	states	 in	question.	We	suspect	 that	 the	person	
would	not	really	mean	good	when	she	said	‘good’.	On	the	other	hand,	
to	(t),	they	could	truly	judge	that	(t)	is	bad.	Our	analysis	is	consistent	with	
this,	so	long	as	which	states	it	is	fitting	for	each	agent	to	have	non-comparative 
pro-attitudes	(like	desire,	gladness,	and	hope)	towards	depends	upon	which	
alternative	states	are	relevant	in	the	context	of	judgment.	What	is	presumably	
foundational	are	context-independent	facts	about	which	comparative	pro-atti-
tudes	or	preferences	among	states	it	is	fitting	for	each	agent	to	have	(e. g.	the	
Joneses	should	prefer	(b)	to	(t)	and	(t)	to	(n)),	and	it	is	fitting	for	an	agent	to	
have	a	non-comparative	pro-attitude	towards	a	state	just	in	case	it	is	fitting	for	
her	to	prefer	it	to	the	relevant	alternatives	(see	Gibbard	1998).	We	are	grateful	
to	Doug	Portmore	for	suggesting	this	example	and	encouraging	us	to	discuss	
this	issue.
29.	Other	plausible	examples	of	 this	general	propensity	of	 judgments	 that	atti-
tudes	are	fitting	include	the	abilities	of	judgments	that	beliefs	are	warranted	
by	our	evidence,	that	it	is	appropriate	to	be	angry	at	someone,	and	that	we	
should	 (in	 a	 non-pragmatic	 sense)	 intend	 to	 do	 certain	 things	 to	 directly	
generate	 those	beliefs,	 feelings	of	anger,	and	 intentions	(see	Gibbard	1990,	
36–76;	and	Scanlon	1998,	18–22).	
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fitting	 to	be	moved	to	bring S about	when	one	can	without	actually	
counting	in	favor	of	bringing S about	when	one	can.32
It	is	intuitive	that	what	there	is	reason	to	do	is	determined	by	what	
aims	there	is	reason	to	have.	We	think	that	the	best	theoretical	expla-
nation	of	MAP	is	that,	because	practical	reasoning	governs	our	actions	
by	means	of	governing	our	motives,	the	process	of	determining	what	
aims	to	have	—	and	thus	what	to	do	—	is	essentially	a	process	of	deter-
mining	what	intrinsic	motives	to	have.	As	Michael	Bratman	(1987,	54)	
has	 suggested,	 because	our	practical	 reasoning	 controls	 our	 actions	
by	controlling	our	intentions	to	perform	them,	reasons	to	perform	an	
action	just	are	reasons	to	intend	to	perform	it	(for	a	related	idea,	see	
Scanlon	1998,	20–21).	But	it	must	be	clarified	that	reasons	to	do	A	are	
identical	to	fittingness	reasons	to	intend	to	do	A.	As	Kavka’s	(1983)	toxin	
puzzle	illustrates,	merely	pragmatic	reasons	to	intend	to	do	something	
(like	the	reason	to	intend	—	or	get	oneself	to	intend	—	to	drink	a	toxin	
constituted	by	the	fact	that	a	reliable	mind-reader	will	pay	you	if	you	
intend	this)	need	not	be	reasons	to	actually	do	it.
Moreover,	 in	 light	of	 the	 role	 intentions	play	 in	 realizing	 the	ob-
jects	of	our	desires	and	other	pro-attitudes,	there	are	similar	reasons	
to	think	that,	because	reason	ultimately	governs	our	intentions	by	gov-
erning	these	attitudes,	the	fittingness	of	intentions	is	itself	determined	
by	the	fittingness	of	these	other	motives.	As	Bratman	argues,	the	role	
of	intentions	is	not	to	supply	an	utterly	new	source	of	motivation	that	
conflicts	with	 the	motives	 involved	 in	our	pro-	 (and	 con-)	 attitudes	
(like	desires	for	states	of	affairs),	but	to	help	cognitively	limited	agents	
like	us	realize	the	objects	of	these	motives	over	time.	This	role	of	in-
tentions	entails	that	their	normative	assessment	must	be	tied	closely	
to	that	of	the	pro-attitudes	they	serve.	
Although	Bratman	often	speaks	as	though	practical	reasoning	must	
simply	 take	 our	 intrinsic	 pro-attitudes	 as	 given,	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	
32.	WCP	and	MAP	closely	resemble	John	Skorupski’s	principles	FDF	and	FDD,	
the	conjunction	of	which	he	referred	to	as	the	“Feeling	/	Disposition	Princi-
ple”	(1999,	38,	63,	131,	and	174	n24)	and	more	recently	as	the	“Bridge	Principle”	
(2010,	265–267).
question	of	what	aims	 there	 is	 reason	 to	have	 is	 identical	 to	 that	of	
what	it	is	fitting	to	be	motivated	to	do.	Since	pro-attitudes	like	desiring	
or	hoping	that	state	S	obtains	involve	motivation	to	bring	S	about	(if	
one	can),	the	fittingness	of	these	attitudes	entails	the	fittingness	of	this	
motivation,	which	entails	the	existence	of	reasons	to	bring	S	about	(if	
one	can).
The	first	part	of	this	connection	between	fitting	attitudes	and	rea-
sons	to	act	can	be	stated	as	a
Warrant Composition Principle [WCP]:	Let	P	be	a	psychic	
state	 that	 involves	 psychic	 state	Pʹ	 as	 an	 essential	 com-
ponent.	If	R	is	a	fittingness	reason	to	be	in	P,	then	R	is	a	
fittingness	reason	to	be	in	Pʹ.
WCP	simply	states	that	if	there	is	reason	to	be	in	a	psychic	state,	then	
necessarily	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 be	 in	 all	 that	 the	 state	 essentially	 in-
volves.	For	instance,	if	one	acknowledges	our	claim	that	part	of	what	it	
is	to	desire	or	hope	that	S	obtains	is	to	be	motivated	to	bring	S	about	if	
one	can,	it	would	seem	incoherent	to	hold	that	a	consideration	(like	S’s	
involving	happy	children)	counts	in	favor	of	hoping	or	desiring	that	S 
obtains	but	does	not	count	in	favor	of	being	motivated	to	bring	S	about	
if	one	can.	Since	having	the	motivation	is	simply	part	of	what	it	is	to	
have	 the	pro-attitude,	 a	 consideration	 cannot	make	 the	pro-attitude	
fitting	without	making	the	motivation	fitting	as	well.
The	 second	part	of	 this	 connection	between	fitting	attitudes	and	
reasons	to	act	is	the	relationship	between	what	it	is	fitting	to	be	moti-
vated	to	do	and	what	there	is	reason	to	do,	which	we	state	as	a
Motivations-Actions Principle [MAP]: Let φ-ing be an ac-
tion. If R is a fittingness reason to be motivated to φ, then 
R is a reason to actually φ.
Just	as	the	consideration	that	S	would	make	children	happy	can’t	make	
it	fitting	to	desire	S	without	making	it	fitting	to	be	moved	to	bring	S 
about	when	one	can,	so	too	it	seems	this	consideration	can’t	make	it	
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It	is	important	to	clarify	that	neither	MAP	nor	this	explanation	of	
it	makes	what	 there	 is	 reason	 for	us	 to	do	dependent	upon	what	at-
titudes	or	motives	we	actually	happen	to	have.	The	idea	is	that	what	
there	is	reason	for	an	agent	to	do	is	what	would	serve	the	objects	of	
fitting	intrinsic	motives,	by	which	we	mean	the	intrinsic	motives	that	
it	would be fitting	 for	her	to	have,	whether she has them or not.	On	this	
view,	if	a	consideration	(like	a	policy’s	benefitting	the	worse-off)	is	a	
fittingness	reason	for	an	agent	to	be	motivated	to	do	something	(like	
vote	for	the	policy	if	she	can),	then	it	is	a	reason	for	the	agent	to	do	
this	regardless	of	whether	she	ever	has	or	comes	to	have	any	actual	
motivation	to	do	it.35 
might	insist,	for	instance,	that	we	cannot	distinguish	between	fittingness	and	
non-fittingness	reasons	for	motivations	and	intentions	without	appealing	to	
facts	about	which	considerations	are	reasons	to	perform	the	acts	that	these	
motives	and	intentions	would	incline	us	to	perform.	While	we	think	that	our	
basic	argument	could	be	made	using	this	alternative	explanation	of	MAP,	it	
might	not	fit	as	well	with	our	claims	about	the	relationship	between	fitting	
motives	and	ethical	categories,	or	our	claims	to	be	giving	a	deeper	explana-
tion	of	 the	 connection	between	ethical	 categories	and	 reasons	 to	act.	One	
could	not	hold	that	what	there	is	reason	to	do	by	itself	explains	the	fitting-
ness	of	all	motivational	attitudes,	since	both	fitting	and	unfitting	motivational	
attitudes	(e.g.	wanting	S	out	of	fitting	care	for	someone	and	wanting	S	out	of	
unfitting	aesthetic	appreciation	for	S)	can	incline	us	to	perform	the	same	acts.	
One	might	hold	 that	 something’s	 instantiating	an	ethical	 category	 (like	S’s	
being	good)	jointly	explains	the	fittingness	of	pro-	or	con-attitudes	towards	
it	(like	desires	for	S)	and	reasons	to	act	in	certain	ways	(like	to	bring	about	
S).	We	think	that	we	could	still	use	this	account	to	argue	that	the	connection	
between	good	states	and	reasons	to	act	should	be	seen	as	a	special	case	of	the	
connection	between	ethical	categories,	fitting	motives,	and	reasons	to	act.	But	
it	would	weaken	the	sense	in	which	we	would	be	explaining	—	as	opposed	
to	appealing	to	—	the	relationship	between	ethical	categories	and	reasons	to	
act.	In	part	because	of	this,	there	would	seem	to	be	more	room	on	this	sort	
of	“joint	explanation”	picture	to	hold	that	a	state’s	goodness	explains	both	the	
fittingness	of	desires	for	it	and	reasons	to	bring	it	about,	but	to	deny	that	the	
instantiation	of	other	ethical	categories	explains	reasons	to	act	in	addition	to	
the	fittingness	of	certain	motivational	states.
35.	 The	point	of	the	appeals	to	how	actions	and	intentions	are	governed	by	rea-
son	is	simply	to	establish	that,	because	(in	the	absence	of	something	going	
wrong	—	as	when	we	do	the	right	thing	for	the	wrong	reasons)	we	can	only	
respond	to	genuine	normative	reasons	to	act	and	intend	by	our	motives	first	
responding	to	these	considerations,	fittingness	reasons	to	be	motivated	to	do	
something	are	fittingness	reasons	to	intend	to	do	it	and	practical	reasons	to	
we	 can	 assess	 them	 as	 reasonable	 or	 unreasonable	 by	 determining	
through	philosophical	reasoning	whether	they	are	fitting	or	unfitting.33 
Moreover,	as	we	have	seen,	it	is	characteristic	of	these	fittingness	as-
sessments	 that	 they	 directly	 guide	 our	 attitudes.	 For	 instance,	 one	
might	start	out	with	a	much	stronger	intrinsic	desire	for	one’s	co-na-
tionals	to	be	benefitted	but,	as	a	result	of	reflection	on	just	what	co-na-
tionality	amounts	to,	come	to	regard	this	preference	as	arbitrary.	This	
judgment	that	one’s	preference	is	unfitting	tends	directly	to	change	it,	
and	to	alter	one’s	 intentions	 from	serving	the	old	aim	of	benefitting	
one’s	co-nationals	more	to	serving	the	new	aim	of	benefitting	aliens	
just	as	much.	
Thus,	 because	 reason	 governs	 motives	 other	 than	 intentions	
through	determinations	of	their	fittingness,	and	intentions	are	simply	
a	means	of	achieving	the	objects	of	these	motives,	fittingness	reasons	
for	 intention	 are	 identical	 to	fittingness	 reasons	 for	 these	other	mo-
tives.	The	role	of	 intentions	 is	primarily	 to	enable	us	 to	settle	 in	ad-
vance	what	future	courses	of	action	will	best	achieve	the	ends	that	it	
is	fitting	to	be	most	motivated	to	achieve,	and	to	pick	from	among	the	
many	courses	of	action	that	often	have	equally	good	prospects	of	do-
ing	this.	Together	with	the	above	observation	that	reason	governs	our	
actions	through	determinations	of	the	fittingness	of	the	intentions	that	
lead	us	to	perform	them,	this	entails	that,	because	reason	ultimately	
governs	our	intentions	and	actions	by	determining	the	fittingness	of	
the	motives	they	seek	to	serve,	fittingness	reasons	to	be	motivated	to	
do	something	are	identical	to	fittingness	reasons	to	intend	to	do	it	and	
practical	reasons	to	do	it.34
33.	While	Bratman	often	speaks	as	though	our	intrinsic	desires	or	pro-attitudes	
are	themselves	normative	reasons	for	intention	and	action,	he	makes	it	clear	
that	he	actually	wishes	to	remain	neutral	between	this	view	and	the	view	that	
our	intrinsic	desires	can	be	assessed	as	reasonable	or	unreasonable	(1987,	22).
34.	As	with	the	connection	between	a	state’s	goodness	and	the	fittingness	of	pro-
attitudes	towards	it,	what	is	most	central	to	our	argument	is	the	existence	of	
the	connection	asserted	by	WCP	and	MAP	between	the	fittingness	of	motiva-
tional	attitudes	and	reasons	to	act,	rather	than	our	particular	explanation	of	
why	these	principles	are	correct.	Suppose	we	were	wrong	about	the	fitting-
ness	of	motivational	states	being	explanatorily	prior	to	reasons	to	act.	One	
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4. Rejecting the Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
Recall	that	the	top-down	strategy	of	arguing	for	consequentialism	con-
tends	that	morality	should	give	us	reasons	to	act,	that	there	clearly	are	
reasons	to	bring	about	good	states	of	affairs,	but	that	it	is	unclear	how	
there	could	be	reasons	to	do	anything	else	that	looks	moral.	We	have	
so	far	offered	an	explanation	of	the	clear	reasons	to	bring	about	the	
good	 that	motivate	 the	 top-down	strategy	as	a	 special	 instance	of	 a	
general	connection	between	fitting	attitudes	and	reasons	to	act	as	they	
would	motivate	us.	But	in	this	section	and	the	next	we	will	undermine	
the	top-down	strategy	by	showing	how	this	same	general	connection	
between	fitting	attitudes	and	reasons	to	act	makes	it	equally	clear	how	
there	could	be	reasons	—	and	indeed	moral	reasons	—	to	do	things	oth-
er	than	promote	the	good.
The	logically	strongest	version	of	the	top-down	strategy	holds	that	
moral	reasons	to	act	must	be	reasons	to	bring	about	good	outcomes	
because	all reasons	to	act	are	reasons	to	bring	about	good	outcomes.	
This	 view	 that	 all	 practical	 reasons	must	 be	 reasons	 to	 bring	 about	
good	outcomes	is	known	as	the teleological conception of practical reasons 
[TCR].	Of	course,	it	certainly	seems	that	there	are	reasons	for	each	of	
us	to	do	things	like	avoid	our	own	pain	or	help	our	own	children	that	
are	not	proportionate	to	the	badness	of	our	pain	or	our	children’s	dis-
tress	assessed from an impartial perspective.	That	is,	although	there	might	
seem	to	be	stronger	reasons	to	avoid	our	pain	and	help	our	children	
than	 to	alleviate	 the	pain	and	help	 the	children	of	others,	we	could	
not	 truly	say	 to	 those	others	 that	our	pain	or	our	children’s	distress	
is	worse	than	theirs.	But,	as	we	have	seen,	in	contexts	(like	talking	to	
our	partners)	where	our	interlocutors	share	our	fittingness	reasons	to	
have	a	stronger	aversion	to	our	pain	or	our	children’s	distress	than	to	
that	of	others,	it	seems	that	we	can	truly	claim	that	developments	that	
mitigate	the	former	are	better	than	those	that	mitigate	the	latter.
TCR	 can	 thus	 accommodate	practical	 reasons	 to	do	 things	 other	
than	promote	the	impartial	good	by	holding	that	the	practical	reasons	
there	are	 for	an	agent	 to	act	must	be	 reasons	 to	promote	outcomes	
Having	 thus	 argued	 in	 favor	 of	 our	 fitting	 attitude	 analysis	 of	 good	
states,	WCP,	and	MAP,	we	can	use	them	to	give	the	following	explana-
tion	of	why,	if	a	state	of	affairs	is	good,	there	is	reason	to	bring	it	about:
1.	If	state	of	affairs S is	good,	then	there	are	fittingness	reasons	
for	us	to	have	a	pro-attitude	towards S [from	the	fitting	at-
titude	analysis	of	good	states].	
2.	 If	 there	are	fittingness	 reasons	 for	us	 to	have	a	pro-attitude	
towards	S,	 then	 there	are	fittingness	 reasons	 for	us	 to	be	
motivated	to	bring S about	if	we	can36	[from	WCP	and	the	
fact	that	pro-attitudes	towards	S	essentially	involve	motiva-
tion	to	bring S about	if	one	can].
3.	If	there	are	fittingness	reasons	for	us	to	be	motivated	to	bring	
S	about	if	we	can,	then	there	are	reasons	to	bring S about	if	
we	can	[from	MAP].
∴		If S is	good,	then	there	are	reasons	to	bring S about	if	we	can.
do	it.	The	underlying	idea	is	that	if	R	is	a	genuine	normative	reason	for	us	to	
respond	in	way	W,	and	(absent	something	going	wrong)	we	can	only	have	W 
in	response	to	R	by	having	(and	because	we	have)	W*	in	response	to	R,	then	
R	is	a	reason	to	W*,	and	its	status	as	such	explains	its	status	as	a	reason	to	W.
36.	At	least	so	long	as	it	would	still	be	fitting	to	have	a	pro-attitude	towards	S	if	
you	actually	brought	S	about.	Perhaps	it	is	conceptually	coherent	to	think	that	
there	are	states	that	would	not	befit	pro-attitudes	if	you	did	anything	to	bring	
them	about.	One	might	 think	 it	fitting	 to	desire	 the	 existence	of	 a	natural	
environment,	but	that	it	would	be	unfitting	to	desire	its	existence	if	it	were	
damaged	 and	 then	 restored,	 on	 account	 of	 its	 losing	 its	 naturalness.	 Even	
here,	there	would	be	cases	where	you	could	bring	about	the	environment’s	
existence	without	destroying	its	status	as	fittingly	desired	—	e.g.	by	prevent-
ing	others	 from	destroying	 it	 or	 just	 refraining	 from	destroying	 it	 yourself.	
Alternatively,	one	might	think	it	fitting	to	desire	some	state,	but	that	it	would	
be	wrong	to	try	to	bring	it	about,	and	consequently	that	it	would	be	unfitting	
to	have	a	pro-attitude	 towards	 it	 (qua	product	of	wrongdoing)	once	 it	was	
brought	about.	Even	here,	we	are	not	sure	whether	we	should	say	that	there	
would	be	no	reason	to	bring	about	the	state,	or	whether	there	would	still	be	
some	reason	to	do	so,	which	is	simply	outweighed	by	the	features	that	would	
make	it	completely	unfitting	to	have	pro-attitudes	towards	it	once	it	existed.
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We	think,	moreover,	that	many	of	the	attitudes	we	commonly	have	
involve	 intrinsic	act-directed	motives.	Consider	emotions	 like	anger,	
guilt,	shame,	admiration,	contempt,	grief,	and	aesthetic	appreciation.	
Plausibly,	 these	 emotions	 essentially	 involve,	 respectively,	 intrinsic	
motivation	to	punish	or	hold	the	object	of	our	anger	accountable,	in-
trinsic	motivation	to	make	amends	for	the	object	of	our	guilt,	intrinsic	
motivation	to	withdraw	and	remove	the	object	of	our	shame,	intrinsic	
motivation	to	emulate	the	object	of	our	admiration,	 intrinsic	motiva-
tion	to	avoid	and	behave	unlike	the	object	of	our	contempt,	intrinsic	
motivation	to	honor	the	object	of	our	grief,	and	intrinsic	motivation	to	
engage	with	(e. g.	to	create,	perform,	watch,	or	listen	to)	the	object	of	
our	appreciation.37 
These	 attitudes	 that	 involve	 intrinsic	 act-directed	motivations	 of-
ten	seem	fitting	or	appropriate,	and	there	is	no	reason	in	the	abstract	
to	be	any	more	skeptical	that	they	are	sometimes	fitting	than	there	is	
to	be	skeptical	that	state-directed	pro-attitudes	are	sometimes	fitting.38 
When	these	attitudes	are	fitting,	the	same	two	principles	that	explain	
why	there	are	reasons	to	bring	about	good	states	of	affairs	will	entail	
that	there	are	intrinsic	reasons	to	act	as	they	motivate	us,	quite	inde-
pendently	of	whether	our	doing	so	will	bring	about	good	states.	Since	
these	attitudes	essentially	involve	intrinsic	act-directed	motives,	WCP	
entails	that	any	fittingness	reason	to	have	them	is	equally	a	fittingness	
reason	to	have	the	act-directed	motives	they	involve.	Moreover,	MAP	
implies	that	these	fittingness	reasons	to	have	the	intrinsic	act-directed	
motives	are	actually	intrinsic	reasons	to	perform	(or	avoid	performing)	
the	acts	they	are	directed	towards	(or	against).
37.	 See	for	instance	Gibbard	1990,	Anderson	1993,	Velleman	2002,	and	Darwall	
2002,	2006.
38.	 It	would,	moreover,	be	self-defeating	for	teleologists	to	reject	the	idea	of	fit-
tingness	reasons	and	acknowledge	only	pragmatic	reasons	for	attitudes.	This	
is	because	their	own	account	of	the	relationship	between	reasons	for	state-
directed	motives	 and	 reasons	 to	 act	must	 be	 in	 terms	of	 fittingness	 rather	
than	pragmatic	reasons	for	motives	(else	the	pragmatic	reason	to	intrinsically	
desire	 that	 your	 loved	ones	be	harmed	constituted	by	a	demon’s	 threat	 to	
harm	them	unless	you	form	this	intrinsic	desire	would	count	—	absurdly	—	as	
an	intrinsic	reason	to	actually	harm	them).
that	she	can	truly	judge	good.	As	we	have	seen	in	the	last	two	sections,	
what	determines	both	what	states	an	agent	can	judge	good	and	her	
reasons	to	promote	such	states	are	the	fittingness	reasons	there	are	for	
her	to	have	pro-attitudes	towards	them.	So	the	clearest	way	to	put	TCR	
is	as	the	thesis	that	all	reasons	for	an	agent	to	act	are	reasons	for	her	to	
bring	about	states	of	affairs	that	there	are	fittingness	reasons	for	her	to	
have	pro-attitudes	towards.
	Perhaps	the	most	natural	way	of	motivating	TCR	is	to	argue,	as	we	
have	in	support	of	MAP,	that	reasons	to	act	are	reasons	to	bring	about	
the	objects	of	fitting	motives,	and	then	to	simply	assume	that	all	mo-
tives	(and	thus	all	motives	that	can	be	fitting)	are	state-directed.	Thus	
Douglas	Portmore	claims,	“If	our	actions	are	the	means	by	which	we	
affect	the	way	the	world	goes,	and	if	our	intentional	actions	necessar-
ily	aim	at	making	the	world	go	a	certain	way,	then	it	is	only	natural	to	
suppose	that	what	we	have	most	reason	to	do	is	determined	by	which	
way	we	have	most	reason	to	want	the	world	to	go”	(2011,	56).	In	claim-
ing	that	“our	intentional	actions	necessarily	aim	at	making	the	world	
go	a	certain	way”,	Portmore	seems	to	be	assuming	that	all	motives	on	
which	we	act	aim	at	bringing	about	certain	states	of	affairs.	
We	have	argued	that	Portmore	is	right	that	intentional	actions	aim	
at	achieving	the	objects	of	our	motives,	and	that	what	we	have	most	
reason	to	do	 is	determined	by	what	we	have	most	reason	to	be	mo-
tivated	 to	 do.	 But	we	have	 also	 argued	 that	 Portmore’s	 apparent	 as-
sumption	that	all	motives	aim	at	states	of	affairs	is	mistaken.	We	sup-
pose	one	could,	as	Portmore	says,	“intend	to	run	merely	for	the	sake	of	
bringing	it	about	that	one	runs”	(2011,	56).	But	that	would	be	bizarre.	
In	cases	where	you	run	just	because	you	feel	like	running,	you	have	
an	act-directed	 intrinsic	motive	 to run,	and	you	 form	an	act-directed	
intention	to	do	this.	Ordinarily,	you	do	not	seek	to	make	it	 the	case	
that	the	world	contains	instances	of	your	running	(or	instances	of	your	
running	now)	unless	you	have	ulterior	reasons	to	ensure	this	(like	your	
being	paid	for	how	much	running	time	you	log)	and	you	find	yourself	
without	any	act-directed	motivation	to	run.	
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act.	But	the	existence	and	fittingness	of	pro-attitudes	towards	states	of	
affairs	in	which	we	act	as	fitting	act-directed	motives	would	incline	us	
(e. g.	in	which	we	make	amends	to	our	rival	or	attend	his	funeral)	are ex-
plained by, and thus cannot supplant	the	fittingness	of	these	act-directed	
motives	and	the	basic	act-directed	reasons	they	generate.39
Portmore	has	argued	that	TCR	should	be	accepted	because	it	provides	
a	maximally	plausible	and	unified	account	of	the	relationship	between	
which	outcomes	we	have	most	 reason	 to	prefer	 and	which	 acts	we	
have	most	 reason	 to	perform.	There	clearly	are	some cases	 in	which	
there	is	more	reason	for	us	to	perform	act	ai	than	act	aj	because	there	is	
more	fittingness	reason	for	us	to	prefer	the	outcome	of	ai	(call	this	oi)	to	
the	outcome	of	aj	(call	this	oj).	For	instance,	our	stronger	reasons	to	in-
vest	in	a	mutual	fund	that	will	deliver	a	higher	return	than	its	alterna-
tives	clearly	stem	from	our	stronger	reasons	to	prefer	the	outcome	of	
investing	in	the	first	to	that	of	investing	in	the	second.	There	are	other	
39.	 In	response	to	Anderson’s	“expressive	theory”	of	practical	reasons	that	one	
should	 act	 only	 in	 ways	 that	 adequately	 express	 one’s	 rational	 attitudes	
(which	 bears	 close	 similarities	 to	 our	 explanation	 of	 the	 relationship	 be-
tween	fitting	motives	and	reasons	to	act),	Portmore	(2011,	80)	correctly	ob-
serves	that	the	teleologist	can	point	to	desires	for	states	(like	that	of	one’s	
current	 actions	 adequately	 expressing	one’s	 rational	 attitudes)	 that	would	
motivate	the	same	acts	as	Anderson’s	theory.	Moreover,	it	is	plausible	that	
these	desires	 are	fitting.	 But	Portmore	 seems	quite	wrong	 to	 suggest	 that	
the	fittingness	of	desires	for	these	states	explains	our	reasons	to	act	as	our	
fitting	act-directed	motives	dictate.	Our	reasons	to	act	as	fitting	act-directed	
motives	dictate	are	no	more	in	need	of	the	fittingness	of	a	desire	that	we	act	
as	our	fitting	motives	direct	 than	our	 reasons	 to	act	as	fitting	state-directed 
motives	(e. g.	to	promote	someone’s	happiness)	are	in	need	of	the	fittingness	
of	this	general	desire.	In	both	cases	the	connection	between	the	fittingness	
of	the	motive	and	the	reasons	to	act	out	of	it	are	explained	by	WCP	and	MAP	
directly,	and	without	the	need	of	the	fittingness	of	some	general	desire	to	act	
as	there	is	reason	to	act	(i. e.	to	act	as	fitting	motives	direct).	The	fittingness	
of	a	desire	to	promote	someone’s	happiness	[DH]	and	the	state-directed	rea-
sons	it	generates	to	promote	her	happiness	(together	with	the	fact	that	it	is	
fitting	to	desire	that	we	feel	and	do	what	is	reasonable)	explain	and	are	not	
explained	by	the	fittingness	of	desiring	the	state	of	affairs	in	which	one	acts	
on	DH.	In	the	exact	same	way,	the	fittingness	of	an	act-directed	motivation	
to	make	 amends	 [MA]	 and	 the	 act-directed	 reasons	 it	 generates	 to	make	
amends	explain	and	are	not	explained	by	the	fittingness	of	desiring	the	state	
of	affairs	in	which	one	acts	on	MA.
For	instance,	suppose	(as	seems	plausible)	that	the	fact	that	your	
conduct	has	harmed	someone	makes	for	the	fittingness	of	feeling	(i. e.	
is	a	fittingness	reason	to	feel)	guilt	for	what	you	have	done.	Since	guilt	
essentially	involves	intrinsic	motivation	to	make	amends,	WCP	entails	
that	this	fact	is	equally	a	fittingness	reason	to	be	intrinsically	motivat-
ed	to	make	amends,	and	MAP	entails	that	this	fittingness	reason	to	be	
intrinsically	motivated	to	make	amends	is	actually	an	intrinsic	reason	
to	make	amends	for	what	you	have	done.	Similarly,	suppose	the	fact	
that	a	painting	would	 look	a	certain	way	or	a	piece	of	music	would	
sound	a	certain	way	makes	 for	 the	fittingness	of	aesthetically	appre-
ciating	 the	potential	painting	or	music.	 Since	aesthetic	 appreciation	
essentially	involves	intrinsic	motivation	to	engage	with	its	object	(for	
instance	by	 composing	or	performing	 it),	WCP	entails	 that	 this	 fact	
is	equally	a	fittingness	reason	to	be	intrinsically	motivated	to	engage	
with	the	painting	or	music,	and	given	this,	MAP	entails	 that	 it	 is	an	
intrinsic	reason	to	actually	engage	with	the	painting	or	music	(e. g.	to	
actually	compose	or	perform	it).	These	act-directed reasons	to	act	as	fit-
ting	intrinsic	act-directed	motives	dictate	need	no	more	sanction	from	
fitting	state-directed	motives	than	state-directed reasons	to	act	as	fitting	
intrinsic	state-directed	motives	(like	that	to	promote	someone’s	happi-
ness)	dictate	need	sanction	from	fitting	act-directed	motives.
Of	course	there	are	times	when	we	acknowledge	that	an	act-direct-
ed	motive	would	be	fitting,	but	find	ourselves	without	 it.	We	might	
feel	no	guilt	for	having	harmed	our	rival	or	feel	no	grief	at	his	passing,	
yet	recognize	that	it	would	be	fitting	to	feel	some	such	guilt	or	grief.	In	
these	cases	it	is	natural,	and	it	seems	fitting,	for	us	to	desire	the	state	of	
our	having	these	act-directed	motives	or	at	least	that	of	our	respond-
ing	to	the	act-directed	reasons	constituted	by	the	factors	(e. g.	that	we	
have	harmed	our	rival	or	that	he	has	passed	away)	that	make	for	their	
fittingness.	Moreover,	in	cases	in	which	we	have	and	act	from	what	we	
regard	as	fitting	act-directed	motives,	it	is	natural	and	evidently	fitting	
to	be	glad	that	we	have	and	act	from	them.	This	is	a	special	case	of	the	
general	fact	that	it	is	natural	and	evidently	fitting	to	have	pro-attitudes	
towards	our	feeling	and	acting	as	it	is	fitting	and	reasonable	to	feel	and	
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In	cases	where	all	reasons	to	perform	ai	and	aj	are	state-directed,	(FM)	
will	take	the	particular	form	
(FP)	one	has	more	fittingness	reason	to	prefer	oi	over	oj.
In	cases	where	some	reasons	to	perform	ai	or	aj	are	act-directed,	the	
instance	of	(FM)	that	explains	(RA)	will	not	take	the	form	(FP),	but	it	
will	explain	(RA)	just	as	well.	Our	explanation	thus	goes	deeper	than	
TCR’s.	By	drawing	on	considerations	of	how	practical	reasoning	gov-
erns	motivation,	intention,	and	action,	it	explains	why it is	that	fitting	
state-directed	preferences	account	for	our	practical	reasons	when	they	
do.	 But	 this	 same	 explanation	 also	 explains	why	 fitting	 state-direct-
ed	motives	 do	 not	—	although	 their	 fitting	 act-directed	 counterparts	
do	—	account	for	our	practical	reasons	in	other	cases.40
40.	We	 think	 that	 this	 constitutes	 a	direct	 response	 to	 the	broad	unificationist	
argument	Portmore	(2011,	81–82)	gives	in	§3.4.4,	“In	defense	of	TCR	on	the	
whole”.	In	§3.4.1–3	he	gives	a	more	specific	unificationist	argument.	This	ar-
gument	first	defends	the	biconditional	that	one	has	more	reason	to	perform	
ai	than	aj	iff	one	has	more	reason	to	prefer	oi	to	oj.	It	then	argues	that	TCR’s	
explanation	of	the	biconditional	(that	greater	reasons	to	prefer	oi	to	oj	always	
explain	greater	reasons	to	perform	ai	over	aj)	is	superior	to	its	three	possible	
rivals.	First,	it	can’t	be	that	greater	reasons	to	perform	ai	over	aj	always	explain	
greater	 reasons	 to	prefer	oi	 to	oj,	because	some	cases	 (e. g.	 the	mutual	 fund	
case)	don’t	fit	 this	pattern.	Second,	Portmore	argues	 that	 it	would	be	unac-
ceptably	disunified	to	hold	that	sometimes	greater	reasons	to	prefer	oi to	oj 
explain	greater	reasons	to	perform	ai	over	aj	but	sometimes	vice	versa.	Third,	
Portmore	argues	that	he	can’t	see	how	there	could	be	some	third	factor	that	
always	simultaneously	explains	both	greater	reasons	to	perform	ai	over	aj	and	
greater	reasons	to	prefer	oi	over	oj.	
	 	 We	 strongly	 suspect	 that	 Portmore’s	 biconditional	 is	 false.	 If	 you	 could	
save	five	individuals	by	killing	one	(say,	by	pushing	the	one	into	the	path	of	
a	trolley	about	to	kill	the	five),	we	are	inclined	to	think	that	you	should	more	
strongly	prefer	that	the	five	live,	more	strongly	prefer	that	the	one	is	pushed,	
and	thus	more	strongly	prefer	that	you	push	him,	even	though	you	should	not	
push	him.	It	might	seem	strange	at	first	to	think	that	we	should	hope	that	we	
will	act	as	we	should	not	act.	But	it	is	actually	a	familiar	phenomenon	that	we	
should	hope	that	we	will	have	motives	that	it	is	unfitting	to	have	(e. g.	unwar-
ranted	anger	 towards	one	 if	 that	 is	 the	only	way	to	prevent	an	evil	demon	
from	killing	five).	If,	as	we	have	argued,	what	there	is	reason	to	do	just	is	a	
matter	of	what	it	is	fitting	to	be	motivated	to	do,	it	should	be	no	more	surpris-
ing	for	it	to	be	reasonable	to	hope	that	we	will	do	what	it	is	unreasonable	to	
do	(e. g.	unreasonably	kill	one	individual	if	that	is	the	only	way	to	save	five).	
While	it	is	plausible	that	we	should	intrinsically	value	our	acting	reasonably,	
cases	where	our	reasons	to	perform	ai	over	aj	do	not	seem	to	stem	from	
our	reasons	to	prefer	oi	to	oj.	For	instance,	when	breaking	a	promise	to	
do A will	bring	about	slightly	greater	benefits	than	doing	A,	the	mere	
fact	that	we	have	promised	to	do A can	seem	to	be	a	stronger	intrinsic	
reason	in	favor	of	doing	A	than	the	additional	benefits	are	reasons	to	
omit	A.	Here	our	apparently	stronger	reasons	to	keep	the	promise	do	
not	seem	to	be	generated	by	reasons	to	prefer	the	state	in	which	we	
keep	it;	rather	our	reasons	to	prefer	this	state	seem	to	be	generated	by	
the	fact	that	it	involves	our	doing	what	there	is	greater	reason	for	us	to	
do.	But,	Portmore	argues,	proponents	of	TCR	can	re-describe	our	ap-
parent	intrinsic	reasons	to	keep	promises	as	reasons	to	bring	about	the	
state	of	affairs	in	which	we	keep	our	promises	(or	our	current	prom-
ises),	and	hold	that	these	reasons	do	stem	from	our	reasons	to	prefer	
the	state	of	our	keeping	our	promises.	Although	this	may	conflict	with	
initial	appearances,	Portmore	argues	that	we	should	accept	it	because	
it	 provides	 a	more	unified	 account	 of	 the	 relationship	between	our	
reasons	for	preference	and	our	reasons	for	action.	
But	 our	 account	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 fitting	motives	 and	
reasons	to	act	offers	a	picture	of	how	reasons	for	preference	relate	to	
reasons	for	action	that	is	just	as	unified	as	TCR’s	assertion	that	all	rea-
sons	to	act	are	explained	by	our	reasons	to	prefer	their	outcomes.	WCP	
and	MAP	offer	a	systematic	conceptual	account	of	how	the	fittingness	
of	motives	explains	the	existence	of	reasons	to	act	as	they	would	moti-
vate	us.	Because	fitting	intrinsic	motives	come	in	two	varieties	—	state-
directed	and	act-directed	—	this	unified	explanation	entails	that	there	
will	 be	 intrinsic	 state-directed	 reasons	 corresponding	 to	 the	 former	
and	intrinsic	act-directed	reasons	corresponding	to	the	latter.	On	this	
view,	whenever	
(RA)	one	has	more	reason	to	perform	ai	than	to	perform	aj , 
this	is	because	
(FM)	one	has	more	fittingness	 reason	 to	be	motivated	 to	 per-
form	ai	than	to	perform	aj.
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function	that	makes	the	strength	of	her	preference	for	each	gamble	a	
function	of	the	strength	of	her	preference	for	its	possible	outcomes.42 
The	basic	idea	of	how	to	make	rational	decisions	under	conditions	of	
risk	is	to	perform	the	act	(or	pick	from	among	the	set	of	acts)	with	the	
highest	expected	utility,	which	is	obtained	by	multiplying	one’s	degree	
of	preference	for	each	of	the	act’s	possible	outcomes	by	the	probability	
that	the	outcome	will	obtain	if	one	performs	the	act.43
Since	 decision	 theorizing	 is	 done	with	 such	 heavily	 teleological	
language,	one	might	be	tempted	to	think	that	our	basic	principles	for	
how	to	make	rational	decisions	would	have	to	be	abandoned	or	sub-
stantially	revised	if	TCR	were	rejected.	But	we	think	this	is	an	illusion.	
One	way	 to	 understand	decision	 theory	 is	 as	 a	 theory	 of	what	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	do	in	light	of	one’s	evidence,	assuming	 that	one’s	aims	
and	 expectations	 are	 reasonable.	Another	 (perhaps	more	 common)	
way	is	to	understand	it	as	a	theory	of	what	to	do	given	one’s	aims	and	
expectations	if	one	is	to	retain	a	kind	of	minimal,	instrumental	ratio-
nality.44	Either	way,	the	theory	should	be	entirely	non-committal	as	to	
the	kinds	of	aims	it	 is	reasonable	to	have,	and	in	particular	whether	
they	are	state-directed	or	act-directed.	
Apart	 from	common	 labelling	 conventions,	we	do	not	 think	 that	
there	 is	anything	 in	 the	 framework	of	 standard	decision	 theory	 that	
supports	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 decision	 maker’s	 ultimate	 aims,	
which	are	taken	as	given	or	assumed	to	be	reasonable,	must	be	state-
directed	 as	 opposed	 to	 act-directed	 motives.	 What	 the	 framework	
does	is	understand	acts	as	gambles	{(S
1
, D
1
),	(S
2
, D
2
),	…,	(Sn, Dn)}	that	
associate	each	state	of	 the	world	Si	with	 the	motivationally	 relevant	
42.	 The	main	classic	results	are	due	to	Ramsey	1926,	von	Neumann	and	Morgen-
stern	1944,	and	Savage	1954.
43.	 This	principle	has	been	put	in	teleological	terms	since	its	first	clear	formula-
tion	by	Arnauld	and	Nicole:	 “In	order	 to	 judge	of	what	we	ought	 to	do	 in	
order	to	obtain	a	good	and	to	avoid	an	evil,	 it	 is	necessary	to	consider	not	
only	the	good	and	evil	in	themselves,	but	also	the	probability	of	their	happen-
ing	and	not	happening,	and	to	regard	geometrically	the	proportion	which	all	
these	things	have,	taken	together”	(1662,	367).
44.	 See	Darwall	1983,	Broome	1991,	Gibbard	1998,	and	Joyce	1999.	
Some	may	think	that	TCR	receives	support	 from	decision	theory,	or	
the	theory	of	how	it	is	rational	to	pursue	given	aims	in	light	of	given	
expectations	about	 states	of	 the	world.41	The	basic	question	of	deci-
sion	theory	is	usually	put	as	one	of	how	to	choose	from	a	set	of	acts	
that	can	be	represented	as	functions	from	possible	states	of	the	world	
to	outcomes	that	the	decision	maker	values,	or	gambles	of	the	form	{(S1, 
O1),	 (S2, O2),	…,	 (Sn, On)},	which	associate	each	possible	 state	of	 the	
world	Si	with	an	outcome	Oi	that	will	obtain	if	the	act	is	performed	and	
Si	 obtains.	 If	 the	decision	maker’s	preferences	among	gambles	obey	
certain	 rationality	 constraints,	 they	 can	 be	 represented	 by	 a	 utility	
the	value	of	this,	even	from	our	own	perspectives,	should	be	absolutely	trivial	
compared	to	that	of	someone’s	life	(let	alone	four	lives).	To	look	more	fondly	
upon	one’s	following	the	dictates	of	reason	than	upon	one	(or	certainly	four)	
other	 individuals’	 surviving	would	be	monstrously	narcissistic.	 (The	 exam-
ples	Portmore	uses	to	support	the	biconditional	appear	ill-chosen;	as	he	ad-
mits	[115	n76],	it	is	pre-theoretically	plausible	that	one	should	more	strongly	
prefer	one’s	children	living	than	strangers	living,	and	the	Kantian	idea	that	
one	should	not	lie	to	a	murderer	to	save	his	victims	is	distractingly	absurd.)	
	 	 Still,	 if	Portmore’s	biconditional	did	 turn	out	 to	be	 true,	we	believe	our	
account	 would	 give,	 as	 he	 demands,	 a	 principled	 “explanation	 as	 to	 why	
sometimes	reasons	for	acting	are	explanatorily	prior	and	other	times	reasons	
for	desiring	are	explanatorily	prior”	(2011,	81).	Our	explanation	of	how	act-
directed	 reasons	 for	 action	explain	 the	fittingness	of	pro-attitudes	 towards	
the	state	of	our	acting	on	them	does	rely	upon	the	substantive	view	that	it	
is	fitting	to	prefer	states	in	which	one	does	what	one	has	most	reason	to	do.	
Because	the	proponent	of	TCR	does	not	seem	to	need	such	an	additional	sub-
stantive	view	to	explain	Portmore’s	biconditional,	there	would	be	a	case	that	
TCR’s	explanation	is	simpler.	But	this	simplicity	would	have	to	be	weighed	
against	TCR’s	costs.	We	have	argued	that	there	are	good	functionalist	reasons	
to	believe	that	we	have	act-directed	as	opposed	to	merely	state-directed	mo-
tives	and	good	normative	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 they	are	 sometimes	fitting.	
We	have	also	argued	that	the	very	principles	(WCP	and	MAP)	that	vindicate	
what	truth	there	 is	 in	TCR’s	order	of	explanation	entail	 that	 the	fittingness	
of	 act-directed	motives	 generates	 act-directed	 practical	 reasons.	Moreover,	
there	are	serious	worries	about	the	narcissistic	character	of	some	agent-rela-
tive	reasons	when	they	are	cast	as	state-directed.	Against	all	this,	we	do	not	
believe	that	the	greater	simplicity	of	TCR	would	be	much	of	a	benefit.	
41.	 For	 instance,	 Pettit	 assumes	 that	 the	 plausibility	 of	 non-consequentialist	
views	can	be	dispelled	by	the	following	decision-theoretic	reasoning:	“If	one	
option	has	[better	possible	outcomes	than	all	alternative	options]	such	that	it	
represents	a	better	gamble	than	[those	alternatives]…,	then	surely	that	is	the	
best	option	for	me	to	take”	(1991,	239).
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plausibility	of	standard	decision	theory	in	no	way	counts	against	the	
existence	of	irreducibly	act-directed	practical	reasons.46
5. Practical Reasons to Be Moral, Whether or Not Morality Promotes 
the Good
We	have	thus	argued	that	the	same	principles	that	explain	why	there	
are	reasons	to	promote	good	outcomes,	or	act	as	fitting	state-motives	
dictate,	equally	explain	how	there	can	be	reasons	to	do	other	things,	
which	fitting	act-directed	motives	dictate.	This	 is	sufficient	 to	defeat	
the	logically	strongest	version	of	the	top-down	strategy	of	arguing	for	
consequentialism,	which	holds,	on	 the	basis	of	TCR,	 that	moral	 rea-
sons	must	be	reasons	to	promote	good	outcomes	because	all	practical	
reasons	are	 reasons	 to	promote	good	outcomes.	Our	explanation	of	
how	reasons	to	act	as	fitting	act-directed	motives	dictate	are	generated	
46.	We	 take	 this	 to	 be	 a	 slightly	more	 detailed	 explanation	 of	why,	 as	Hurley	
(1997,	 123–124)	 claims,	 act-directed	 goals	 are	 consistent	 with	 a	 maximiz-
ing	conception	of	practical	 rationality.	One	could	 summarize	 the	plausible	
general	maximizing	principle	as	instructing	us	to	perform	the	acts	that	have	
the	greatest	expected	degree	of	support	by	reasons	(if	we	assume	our	aims	
are	 reasonable);	 or	 the	greatest	 expectation	of	 realizing	 the	objects	of	our	
intrinsic	motives,	weighted	by	 their	 strengths	 (if	 formulated	as	 a	principle	
that	 takes	our	 aims	 as	 “given”).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 that	 the	maximiz-
ing	principle	so	understood	does	not	say	that	we	should	each	have	only	one	
intrinsic	super-aim	to	do	something	like	“maximize	the	expected	reason	or	
motive	support	of	my	actions”.	An	act’s	degree	of	expected	reasons	support	is	
not	some	new	thing	that	agents	are	supposed	to	care	about	over	and	above	
the	fitting	aims	that	it	can	be	expected	to	achieve;	it	is	simply	a	summary	of	
how	it	is	rational	to	trade	off	the	act’s	expectations	of	achieving	those	fitting	
aims	in	light	of	their	importance	and	its	likelihood	of	achieving	them.	
	 	 We	take	one	of	the	main	lessons	of	the	consequentializing	project	of	au-
thors	 like	 Portmore	 to	 be	 that,	 if	 sufficient	 relativization	 is	 allowed	 in	 the	
descriptions	of	states	of	affairs,	for	any	set	of	aims	that	includes	intrinsic	act-
directed	motives,	there	is	a	set	of	purely	state-directed	intrinsic	aims	that	will	
motivate	 the	 same	 conduct	 in	 the	 same	 circumstances.	 The	 reason	why	 it	
matters	whether	an	ordering	of	gambles	represents	intrinsic	motives	that	are	
act-directed	or	purely	state-directed	is	that	the	state-directed	motives	may	not	
be	as	fitting	as	the	act-directed	ones.	For	example,	as	we	will	suggest	below,	
it	seems	plausible	that	it	is	fitting	to	feel	more	strongly	obligated	not	to	kill	
someone	than	to	prevent	five	others	from	dying.	But	it	seems	unfittingly	nar-
cissistic	to	more	strongly	desire	a	state	of	affairs	in	which	five	die	and	you	kill	
no	one	than	a	state	in	which	only	one	dies	and	you	kill	someone.
description	Di	that	will	be	true	of	the	act	if	Si	obtains.	In	cases	where	
all	one’s	intrinsic	motives	for	or	against	performing	the	act	are	state-
directed,	 these	 act-descriptions	will	 include	 only	 the	 outcomes	 that	
the	act	will	bring	about	 if	 the	state	obtains.	But	 in	cases	where	one	
has	intrinsic	act-directed	motives	that	might	(depending	on	the	state	
of	the	world)	favor	or	disfavor	the	act,	these	descriptions	will	include	
properties	of	the	act	(like	is a keeping of a promise, is a killing of an inno-
cent)	other	than	the	outcomes	it	brings	about.	We	can	thus	understand	
the	 standard	 results	 of	 decision	 theory	 as	 telling	us	 that	 if	 the	deci-
sion	maker’s	choices	among	acts	(i. e.	gambles)	obey	certain	rationality	
constraints,	they	can	be	represented	with	a	“utility	function”	that	rep-
resents	the	strength	of	her	motivations	to	perform	various	acts,	where	
the	strength	of	her	motivations	to	perform	an	act	when	its	properties	
are	uncertain	is	a	function	of	the	strengths	of	her	motivations	to	per-
form	it	if	its	properties	were	known	with	certainty.45	We	think	that	this	
framework	actually	enables	us	to	see	more	clearly	the	plausible	idea	
embodied	in	the	principle	of	maximizing	expected	utility,	namely:	the	
more	averse	you	are	(or	should	be)	to	performing	an	act	with	certain	
properties,	the	less	willing	you	should	be	to	perform	an	act	if	there	is	
a	risk	 that	 it	will	have	those	properties,	and	the	greater	 the	expecta-
tion	you	will	need	of	its	having	properties	that	(should)	incline	you	to	
perform	it	in	order	for	it	to	be	rational	for	you	to	take	this	risk.	Since	
this	is	the	principle	that	makes	the	standard	theory	of	rational	decision	
making	plausible,	and	it	applies	just	as	easily	to	cases	where	some	of	
the	decision	maker’s	ultimate	aims	are	act-directed,	we	think	that	the	
45.	 Note	that,	under	conditions	of	risk,	the	representations	with	which	the	agent’s	
act-directed	and	state-directed	motives	will	be	combining	to	explain	acts	and	
act-directed	motives	will	be degrees of belief or credence	that	acts	will	be	parts	of	
ways	of	performing	other	acts	and	that	acts	will	bring	about	states	of	affairs.	
One	therefore	should	not	take	our	accounts	of	act-directed	and	state-directed	
motives	in	section	2	to	be	restricted	to	representations	that	are	flat-out	beliefs,	
or	 to	 the	sorts	of	explanations	of	actions	and	act-directed	motives	 that	are	
produced	by	the	motives	combining	with	flat-out	beliefs.
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be	reasons	to	perform	it	that	are	both	practical	and	distinctively	moral.	
That	said,	we	will	show	in	the	next	section	how	our	account	of	moral	
reasons	can	help	defend	the	plausibility	of	non-consequentialist	moral	
reasons,	for	instance	against	concerns	about	narcissism.
Just	as	 there	 is	a	wide	diversity	of	 states	 that	people	can	coherently	
judge	to	be	good,	there	is	a	wide	diversity	of	acts	that	people	can	co-
herently	—	if	in	many	cases	quite	falsely	—	judge	to	be	morally	wrong	
or	opposed	by	moral	reasons.	These	include	such	plausibly	wrongful	
acts	as	 inflicting	harms,	defecting	in	collective	action	problems,	and	
failing	to	respect	autonomy,	but	also	all	manner	of	apparently	miscel-
laneous	acts,	including	sexual	practices,	drug	use,	swearing,	“playing	
God”,	and	so	on	(quite	independent,	in	many	cases,	of	their	perceived	
consequences).	
We	 think	 that	 the	only	 thing	 that	unifies	 the	content	of	all	 these	
judgments	 is	 that	 those	who	make	 them	 think	 that	we	 should	 feel	
obligated	not	 to	perform	the	acts	 in	question.	Feelings	of	obligation	
are,	as	Richard	Brandt	(1959,	117–118)	observed,	what	you	have	when	
you	see	someone	in	trouble	and	feel	like	you	“just	can’t”	leave	her.	J.S.	
Mill	(1863)	described	the	feeling	as	an	“internal	sanction	of	duty	…	a	
feeling	in	our	own	mind	…	attendant	on	violation	of	duty,	which	in	
properly	cultivated	moral	natures	rises,	in	the	more	serious	cases,	into	
shrinking	 from	 it	 as	 an	 impossibility”,	 and	 “a	mass	 of	 feeling	which	
must	be	broken	through	in	order	to	do	what	violates	our	standard	of	
right”.	The	phenomenology	of	feeling	obligated	not	to	do	something	
is	similar	to	that	of	feeling	guilt	for	having	done	it,	but	whereas	guilt	is	
retrospective,	feeling	obligated	not	to	do	something	involves	a	kind	of	
prospective	guilt-tinged	aversion	to	doing	it.48
48.	 It	is	important,	however,	to	emphasize	that	feeling	obligated	not	to	do	some-
thing	involves	an	aversion	to	doing it,	not	to	the	prospect	of	feeling	guilt	for	
having	done	it.	If	you	saw	someone	in	need	of	help	but	had	on	hand	a	pill	that	
would	prevent	you	from	feeling	guilt	for	failing	to	help	her,	your	feeling	that	
you	“just	can’t”	leave	her	(unlike	an	aversion	to	feeling	guilt)	would	motivate	
you	to	help	her	and	generate	no	motivation	at	all	to	take	the	pill.
	 	 One	 might	 worry	 that	 feeling	 obligated	 not	 to	 do	 something	 involves	
judging	that	it	would	be	wrong	to	do	it,	in	which	case	it	would	be	circular	to	
in	the	same	way	as	reasons	to	promote	good	outcomes	should	demys-
tify	how	 there	could	be	practical	 reasons	 to	do	anything	other	 than	
promote	good	outcomes.
But	just	because	there	can	be	practical	reasons	to	act	as	fitting	act-
directed	motives	dictate	doesn’t	mean	that	there	are	moral	reasons	to	
do	so.	Many	act-directed	reasons,	like	to	run	for	the	sake	of	running	or	
to	perform	or	create	an	artwork,	seem	to	have	little	to	do	with	morality.	
Our	argument	against	TCR	thus	leaves	open	a	version	of	the	top-down	
strategy	 which	 maintains	 that,	 although	 there	 may	 be	 act-directed	
practical	reasons,	they	cannot	be	moral	reasons.	A	proponent	of	this	
top-down	argument	for	consequentialism	might	hold	that	to	be	moral,	
a	reason	must	be	sufficiently	selfless,	disinterested,	or	impartial,	and	
that	the	only	practical	reasons	that	have	these	properties	are	reasons	
to	bring	about	impartially	good	outcomes,	or	states	that	it	is	fitting	for	
all	moral	agents	to	have	pro-attitudes	towards.47 
In	 this	 section	we	argue	 that	 this	 logically	weaker	version	of	 the	
top-down	strategy	is	also	unsound.	We	show	how	the	same	kinds	of	
considerations	that	support	understanding	a	state’s	status	as	good	in	
terms	of	the	fittingness	of	pro-attitudes	towards	it	support	understand-
ing	an	act’s	moral	status	in	terms	of	the	fittingness	of	feeling	obligated	
to	perform	or	avoid	performing	it.	But,	given	the	principles	connecting	
fitting	motives	to	practical	reasons	that	we	defended	in	section	3,	this	
supports	 a	direct	 connection	between	an	 act’s	moral	 status	 and	 rea-
sons	for	or	against	performing	it,	which	holds	quite	independently	of	
whether	the	act	promotes	the	good.	Our	account	of	moral	reasons	is	
logically	consistent	with	the	consequentialist	view	that	all	moral	rea-
sons	are	reasons	to	promote	the	good.	Our	primary	aim	in	this	section	
is	simply	to	extend	our	argument	against	the	top-down	strategy	to	the	
logically	weaker	variety	by	showing	that	we	do	not	need	the	idea	of	
an	act’s	promoting	the	impartial	good	to	make	sense	of	how	there	can	
47.	 Although	most	consequentialists	seem	to	embrace	TCR,	the	idea	that	legiti-
mately	moral	 reasons	must	 favor	promoting	 those	 states	we	 should	prefer	
from	an	impartial	perspective	plays	a	central	role	in	the	arguments	for	conse-
quentialism	of	such	authors	as	R.M.	Hare	(1963,	ch.	6–7),	Singer	(1979,	10–13),	
and	Railton	(1986,	189–190).
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This	supports	the	following	analyses	of	our	concepts	of	moral	rea-
sons	and	moral	wrongness:
Fitting Attitude Analysis of Moral Reasons:	 To	 judge	
that	R	is	a	moral	reason	for	agent	X	to	φ	is	to	judge	that	
R	is	a	fittingness	reason	for	X	to	feel	obligated	to	φ,	and	
Fitting Attitude Analysis of Moral Wrongness:	To	judge	
that	it	is	morally	wrong	for	X	to	ψ	is	to	judge	that	it	is,	on	
balance,	fitting	for	X	to	feel	obligated	not	to	ψ.50
50.	Of	course,	we	can	think	it	perfectly	fitting	for	someone	to	experience	no	feel-
ings	of	obligation	to	refrain	from	doing	things	we	think	wrong	if	she	is	already	
sufficiently	motivated	not	 to	do	them.	 In	most	cases	we	would	never	even	
consider	doing	things	that	would	kill	others,	and	if	we	do,	care	for	those	oth-
ers	and	fear	of	punishment	are	almost	always	sufficient	deterrents.	Although	
we	think	it	would	be	wrong	for	us	to	kill	in	such	cases,	we	surely	do	not	think	
it	inappropriate	that	we	experience	no	feelings	of	obligation	to	refrain	from	
doing	so.	Moreover,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	can	think	it	fitting	on	bal-
ance	to	feel	obligated	to	do	things	that	we	do	not	think	it	wrong	to	fail	to	do.	It	
seems	perfectly	fitting	for	someone	who	goes	above	and	beyond	what	moral-
ity	requires	—	say,	by	getting	killed	to	save	a	younger	stranger	from	death	—	to	
feel	obligated	to	do	what	she	does.
	 	 To	clarify	our	proposal,	it	is	important	to	note	first	that	talk	of	feeling	emo-
tions,	like	talk	of	desiring	or	preferring,	is	ambiguous	between	an	occurrent	
and	a	dispositional	 sense.	Occurrent	 feelings	 and	preferences	 exert	 causal	
pressure	on	one’s	behavior	 at	 the	moment,	 and	 (at	 least	 typically)	 involve	
phenomenal	experiences,	while	dispositional	feelings	and	preferences	mere-
ly	have	the	disposition	to	become	occurrent	in	certain	circumstances.	Thus	
one	can	dispositionally	 feel	obligated	not	 to	push	one’s	 friends	out	of	win-
dows	in	the	same	way	one	can	dispositionally	feel	anger	at	one’s	father	even	
while	one	is	enjoying	his	company	and	experiencing	no	negative	emotions.	
Second,	it	is	important	to	note	that	a	response’s	being	“fitting	on	balance”	is	
ambiguous	between	 (i)	 the	 response’s	being	mandatory,	 in	 that	 there	 is	no	
alternative	response	that	is	as	strongly	supported	by	fittingness	reasons,	or	
(ii)	the	response’s	being	justified,	in	that	there	is	no	alternative	response	that	
is	more	strongly	supported	by	fittingness	reasons.
	 	 In	more	detail,	then,	our	proposal	is	that	to	think	it	morally	wrong	for	X	to	
ψ	is	to	think	that	it	is	mandatory	for	X	to	have	at	least	a	dispositional	feeling	of	
obligation	not	to	ψ	(and	mandatory	for	X	to	have	an	occurrent	feeling	of	ob-
ligation	not	to	ψ only	if	X	is	not	already	sufficiently	motivated	not	to	ψ).	The	
sense	in	which	one	can	judge	it	“fitting	on	balance”	for	X	to	feel	obligated	to	
φ when	one	takes	X’s	φ-ing	to	be	supererogatory	is	that	one	thinks	X’s	feeling	
of	obligation	is	justified	but	not	mandatory.
Thus,	for	reasons	similar	to	those	that	favor	analyzing	judgments	
that	 states	 are	 good	 as	 judgments	 about	 the	 fittingness	 of	 pro-atti-
tudes	 towards	 them,	we	 think	 that	 the	content	and	normative	 force	
of	 judgments	 that	 acts	 are	wrong	or	 opposed	by	moral	 reasons	 are	
best	captured	by	analyzing	them	as	judgments	about	the	fittingness	
of	 feeling	obligated	not	 to	 perform	 them.	 For	 instance,	what	 seems	
distinctive	about	viewing	the	fact	that	doing A will	save	someone’s	life	
as	a	moral reason	to	do A is	one’s	taking	this	consideration	to	count	in	
favor	of	feeling	obligated	to	do	A.49	Similarly,	what	seems	distinctive	
about	thinking	that	the	fact	that	doing A would	kill	someone	makes	it	
morally	wrong	or	forbidden	(as	opposed	to	just	unreasonable)	to	do A 
seems	to	be	one’s	taking	this	consideration	to	make	it,	on	balance,	fit-
ting	for	you	to	feel	obligated	not	to	do	A.	
try	to	explain	judgments	about	wrongness	in	terms	of	judgments	about	the	
fittingness	of	feelings	of	obligation.	But	the	fact	that	we	can	recalcitrantly	feel	
obligated	not	to	do	things	that	we	judge	perfectly	permissible	seems	to	show	
that	 the	 feeling	need	not	 involve	the	 judgment.	For	 instance,	a	gay	person	
raised	in	a	homophobic	culture	might	be	fully	confident	that	it	is	permissible	
to	have	sexual	relationships	with	people	of	the	same	sex,	but	still	have	linger-
ing	feelings	of	obligation	not	to	do	so.	(This	is	an	instance	of	the	general	ob-
jection	from	recalcitrant	emotions	to	the	“judgmentalist”	view	that	emotions	
involve	ethical	or	evaluative	judgments	—	see	Gibbard	1990	and	D’Arms	and	
Jacobson	2003.)
49.	 The	best	alternative	proposal	about	what	is	distinctive	about	viewing	this	as	
a	moral	reason	is	presumably	that	it	 involves	one’s	taking	it	to	be	a	reason	
that	one	has	simply	because	one’s	act	will	promote	the	well-being	of	the	in-
dividual	in	question.	But	it	is	surely	coherent	to	think	that	there	are	distinctly	
moral	reasons	to	do	things	other	than	promote	well-being:	with	some	plau-
sibility	one	can	think	there	are	intrinsic	moral	reasons	to	respect	autonomy	
and	keep	promises,	and	we	know	only	 too	well	what	someone	 is	 thinking	
when	she	takes	the	alleged	fact	that	an	act	is	“unnatural”,	“against	tradition”,	
or	“against	God’s	will”	as	an	intrinsic	moral	reason	against	doing	it.	Moreover,	
although	many	of	us	are	decent	enough	to	accept	a	substantive	principle	of	
beneficence	according	to	which	there	is	intrinsic	moral	reason	to	promote	the	
well-being	of	every	individual	capable	of	well-being,	it	is,	sadly,	coherent	to	
think	otherwise.	The	view	that	there	are	individuals	whose	well-being	there	
is	no	intrinsic	moral	reason	to	promote	(although	perhaps	still	some	intrinsic	
non-moral	reason	to	promote)	has	been	coherently	entertained,	for	instance,	
by	some	who	take	exalted	views	of	the	moral	relevance	of	such	factors	as	ret-
ribution,	autonomy,	promise-keeping,	supernatural	wills,	and	group-loyalty.	
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Given	these	fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	concepts,	the	exact	same	
connection	between	fitting	motives	and	reasons	to	act	 that	explains	
why	there	are	reasons	to	promote	the	good	equally	explains	a	direct	
conceptual	connection	between	an	act’s	moral	status	and	the	existence	
of	practical	reasons	for	or	against	performing	it.	There	is	thus	no	need	
for	 the	 link	 between	morality	 and	 practical	 reasons	 to	 be	mediated	
by	 the	 link	between	good	outcomes	and	practical	 reasons,	 and	 con-
sequently	no	need	for	moral	considerations	to	be	reasons	to	promote	
the	good	in	order	for	us	to	see	how	they	can	be	genuine	reasons	to	act.	
Since	a	judgment’s	truth	entails	the	truth	of	its	analysans,	it	is,	accord-
ing	to	our	fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	judgments,	a	conceptual	
truth	that	(i)	R is	a	moral	reason	for	X	to	φ	iff	R is	a	fittingness	reason	
for	X	to	feel	obligated	to	φ,	and	(ii)	X’s	ψ-ing	is	morally	wrong	iff	it	is 
fitting	for	X	to	feel	obligated	not	to	ψ.52	Since,	as	we	noted,	feeling	ob-
ligated	to	φ essentially	involves	motivation	to	φ	(and	feeling	obligated	
problems.	 In	more	recent	work,	Gibbard	(2008)	has	proposed	to	do	essen-
tially	the	same	thing.
52.	 As	with	the	connection	between	good	states	and	fitting	pro-attitudes,	what	is	
most	central	to	our	argument	is	the	existence	of	these	connections	between	an	
act’s	moral	status	and	fittingness	reasons	to	feel	obligated	to	perform	or	avoid	
performing	it,	rather	than	the	particular	explanation	of	this	connection	pro-
vided	by	our	fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	judgments.	We	do	believe	that	
our	basic	argument	could	be	made	to	work	with	an	alternative	explanation	of	
this	connection,	for	instance	that	what	makes	a	consideration	a	fittingness	as	
opposed	to	a	non-fittingness	reason	to	feel	obligated	to	φ	is	that	it	is	in	fact	a	
moral	reason	to	φ.	We	suspect,	however,	that	such	an	explanation	of	the	con-
nection	between	morality	and	fitting	attitudes	might	be	more	naturally	paired	
with	an	explanation	of	MAP	according	to	which	an	act’s	moral	status	jointly	
explains	both	(a)	the	fittingness	of	feelings	of	obligation	to	perform	or	avoid	
performing	it,	and	(b)	the	existence	of	practical	reasons	to	perform	or	avoid	
performing	it.	For	reasons	we	observed	in	note	34,	this	purported	explanation	
of	MAP	would	seem	to	give	opponents	of	our	argument	more	room	to	hold	
that	an	act’s	moral	status	determines	(a)	without	necessarily	determining	(b).	
Because	we	suspect	 that	our	fitting	attitude	analysis	of	acts’	moral	statuses	
is	 the	explanation	of	the	connection	between	morality	and	fitting	attitudes	
that	is	most	naturally	paired	with	our	explanation	of	MAP,	we	suspect	that	it	
will	be	the	least	vulnerable	to	opponents’	attempts	to	argue	that	MAP	holds	
in	the	case	of	fitting	motives	to	bring	about	states	but	fails	to	hold	in	the	case	
of	fitting	feelings	of	obligation	to	do	things	that	may	not	bring	about	states	
towards	which	it	is	fitting	to	have	pro-attitudes.
Just	as	judgments	about	the	goodness	of	states	have	the	central	nor-
mative	 feature	 of	 guiding	 pro-attitudes	 towards	 them,	 moral	 judg-
ments	seem	to	have	the	central	normative	property	of	guiding	feelings	
of	obligation.	These	fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	judgments	can	
explain	their	ability	to	generate	motivation	to	act	out	of	feelings	of	ob-
ligation	as	a	special	case	of	the	ability	of	judgments	that	attitudes	are	
fitting	to	directly	guide	us	into	having	them.	
To	appreciate	 the	centrality	of	 this	attitude-guiding	 role	of	moral	
judgments,	suppose	that	someone	were	to	label	as	“morally	wrong”	all	
those	things	we	would	call	morally	wrong,	but	took	this	to	have	no	sig-
nificance	for	what	it	was	appropriate	to	feel	obligated	to	do	and	conse-
quently	had	no	propensity	to	feel	obligated	not	to	perform	the	acts	in	
question.	It	seems	that	by	‘morally	wrong’	she	would	not	really	mean	
morally	wrong.	On	the	other	hand,	if	someone	were	to	label	as	“mor-
ally	wrong”	 precisely	 those	 things	we	 think	 permissible,	 she	would	
still	seem	perfectly	intelligible	as	thinking	that	those	things	are	mor-
ally	wrong	so	long	as	she	thought	it	was	fitting	to	feel	obligated	not	to	
perform	them.	That	said,	as	in	the	case	of	our	fitting	attitude	analysis	
of	good	states,	we	will	not	 rely	on	 this	strong	claim	that	 judgments	
about	 the	fittingness	of	 feelings	of	obligation	exhaust	 the	content	of	
moral	judgments.	All	we	require	is	the	claim	that	judgments	about	the	
existence	of	fittingness	reasons	for	feelings	of	obligation	are	entailed	
by	or	part of	the	content	of	moral	judgments.51
51.	 This	analysis	of	moral	concepts	is	defended	at	greater	length	by	Nye	(2009).	
There	have	been	previous	proposals	about	how	to	analyze	moral	judgments	
as	judgments	about	the	fittingness	of	certain	attitudes,	most	notably	the	pro-
posal	of	Gibbard	(1990,	44–45,	126–150).	Gibbard	began	by	analyzing	judg-
ments	that	X’s	ψ-ing	is	morally	blameworthy	as	judgments	that	it	is	fitting	for	X 
to	feel	guilt	for	ψ-ing	and	fitting	for	others	to	feel	anger	at	X	for	ψ-ing.	Gibbard	
then	proposed	 that	we	analyze	 judgments	 that	X’s	ψ-ing	 is	morally	wrong	
as	 judgments	 that	X’s	ψ-ing	would	be	morally	blameworthy	absent	excuse.	
While	we	agree	 that	 there	 is	a	 conceptual	 connection	between	wrongness	
and	blameworthiness,	Gibbard’s	1990	analysis	offers	no	way	of	interpreting	
conflicting	 normative	 judgments	 about	 excuses,	 and	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
role	 of	 normative	 judgments	 in	 guiding	 prospective	 behavior.	We	 believe	
that	adopting	the	analysis	of	moral	wrongness	defended	by	Nye	(2009)	to-
gether	with	Gibbard’s	analysis	of	moral	blameworthiness	can	overcome	these	
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is	not	in	pain.	Absent	special	obligations	to	either	Leslie	or	Gertrude,	
there	is	no	stronger	reason	to	feel	obligated	to	bring it about that	Les-
lie	 is	not	 in	pain	than	to	bring it about	 that	Gertrude	is	not	 in	pain.53 
But	it	is	plausible	that	the	fact	that	your	act	will	cause	Leslie	pain	is	a	
stronger	reason	to	feel	obligated	not to perform it	than	your	reasons	to	
feel	obligated	to	bring	it	about	that	Gertrude	is	not	in	pain.	If	the	only	
way	 to	bring	 it	about	 that	Gertrude	 is	 spared	equal	or	even	slightly	
greater	pain	is	to	inflict	significant	pain	on	Leslie,	it	is	plausible	that	
you	should	still	feel	most	strongly	obligated	not	to	inflict	pain	on	Les-
lie.	If	these	plausible	thoughts	are	true,	the	connection	between	fitting	
attitudes	and	reasons	 to	act	entails	 that,	all	else	held	equal,	 there	 is	
stronger	act-directed	practical	reason	against	inflicting	pain	on	others	
than	simply	bringing	it	about	that	others	are	not	in	pain.
In	fact,	it	follows	from	the	fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	concepts	
that,	in	a	certain	sense,	all	moral	reasons	are	actually	act-directed.	All	
feelings	of	obligation	are	feelings	of	obligation	to	perform	or	omit	acts, 
and	essentially	 involve	motivations	 to perform or omit	 them,	 so	 their	
fittingness	always	makes	for	practical	reasons	that	are	in	some	sense	
act-directed.	It	is	true	that	one	can	feel	obligated	to	perform	an	act	in 
virtue	of	its	having	the	property	of	bringing	about	a	certain	state	of	af-
fairs.	Plausibly,	there	are	basic	moral	reasons	of	beneficence	that	count	
in	favor	of	feeling	obligated	to	perform	acts	simply	in	virtue	of	their	
bringing	about	the	well-being	of	others.	But	these	reasons	are	still	fun-
damentally act-directed,	 in	 that	 they	ultimately	derive	 from	the	fitting-
ness	of	attitudes	towards	acts,	even	though	they	are	intrinsic	reasons	
to	bring	about	states	simply	because	of	what	those	states	involve.54
53.	Moreover,	 there	 does	not	 seem	 to	 be	 any	 stronger	 intrinsic	 reason	 to	 feel	
obligated	to	bring	it	about that	there	is	less	pain-inflicting	in	the	world,	less	
pain-inflicting	done	by	oneself,	or	 less	pain-inflicting	done	by	oneself	now.	
As	we	will	explain	below,	these	suggestions	seem	much	more	vulnerable	to	
charges	of	objectionable	narcissism	than	the	idea	that	there	is	stronger	intrin-
sic	reason	to	feel	obligated	not	to inflict	pain.
54.	 In	the	same	way,	instrumental	reasons	to	perform	acts	so	as	to	bring	about	
good	states	of	affairs	may	be	fundamentally state-directed,	in	that	they	ultimate-
ly	derive	from	the	fittingness	of	attitudes	towards	states,	even	though	they	are	
reasons	to	perform	acts.	Indeed,	even	intrinsic	reasons	to	perform	acts	could	
not	to	ψ essentially	involves	motivation	not	to	ψ),	it	follows	from	(i)	
and	(ii)	together	with	the	Warrant	Composition	Principle	that	(i′)	if	R 
is	a	moral	reason	to	φ,	then	R	is	a	fittingness	reason	to	be	motivated	
to	φ,	 and	 (ii′)	 if	ψ-ing	 is	morally	wrong,	 then	 it	 is	fitting	 to	be	moti-
vated	not	to	ψ.	Moreover,	it	follows	from	(i′)	and	(ii′)	together	with	the	
Motivations-Actions	Principle	that	(i*)	if	R	is	a	moral	reason	to	φ,	then	
R	is	a	genuine	practical	reason	to	φ,	and	(ii*)	if	ψ-ing	is	morally	wrong,	
then	there	are	genuine	practical	reasons	not	to	ψ.
For	instance,	suppose	(as	seems	overwhelmingly	plausible)	that	the	
fact	that	an	act	will	cause	someone	pain	is	an	intrinsic	moral	reason	
not	to	perform	it	—	which,	absent	factors	like	its	preventing	even	more	
egregious	harms	to	others,	will	make	it	wrong	to	perform	it.	Given	the	
fitting	attitude	analyses	of	moral	concepts,	this	entails	that	the	fact	that	
an	act	will	cause	someone	pain	is	a	reason	to	feel	intrinsically	obligat-
ed	not	to	perform	the	act	(i. e.	to	feel	obligated	not	to	perform	the	act	
simply	on	account	of	its	being	a	causing	of	her	pain)	—	which,	absent	
other	 factors,	will	make	 it,	on	balance,	fitting	 to	have	 this	 feeling	of	
obligation.	Since	feeling	intrinsically	obligated	not	to	cause	someone	
pain	involves	intrinsic	motivation	not	to	cause	her	pain,	WCP	entails	
that	the	fact	that	your	act	would	cause	someone	pain	is	equally	a	fit-
tingness	 reason	 to	be	 intrinsically	motivated	not	 to	perform	 the	act.	
Finally,	MAP	entails	that	this	fittingness	reason	to	be	intrinsically	mo-
tivated	not	to	cause	her	pain	is	actually	an	intrinsic	practical	reason	not	
to	cause	her	pain.
Thus,	there	is	no	need	to	think	that	a	moral	reason	against	doing	
something	must	be	a	reason	against	bringing	about	a	sub-optimal	out-
come	in	order	to	see	how	it	can	be	a	genuine	practical	reason	against	
doing	it.	The	mere	fact	that	the	consideration	counts	morally	against	
an	act	directly	entails	 that	 it	 is	a	fittingness	 reason	 to	 feel	obligated	
not	to	do	it,	which	entails	that	it	is	a	practical	reason	against	doing	it.	
There	 is	 no	 reason	 in	 the	 abstract	why	 these	 reasons	 cannot	 be	 en-
tirely	act-directed:	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	the	fact	that	your	act	will	
cause	Leslie	pain	is	a	reason	to	feel	obligated	not to perform that act,	as	
opposed	to	simply	a	reason	to	feel	obligated	to	bring	it	about	that	she	
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an	act’s	moral	status	and	reasons	for	or	against	performing	it,	which	
holds	quite	independently	of	whether	morality	directs	us	to	promote	
the	good.	So	once	we	understand	why	good	states	are	connected	to	
practical	reasons,	we	can	see	that	morality	has	the	exact	same	kind	of	
direct	theoretical	connection	to	practical	reasons,	and	does	not	need	
to	borrow	its	practical	force	from	good	states	by	prescribing	that	we	
promote	them.	
If	our	argument	is	sound,	we	believe	that	it	undermines	the	case	
for	 preferring	 relativized	 versions	 of	 consequentialism	 like	 Port-
more’s	 to	 non-consequentialism,	 as	 this	 case	 relies	 almost	 exclu-
sively	on	the	teleological	conception	of	practical	reasons.	Moreover,	
we	think	our	explanation	of	how	morality	could	give	us	entirely	act- 
directed	 practical	 reasons	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 strength	 of	 the	
case	 for	preferring	non-consequentialism	 to	 relativized	consequen-
tialism.	The	relativized	consequentialist	must	hold	 that	we	are	not	
allowed,	for	instance,	to	perform	one	murder	to	prevent	five	murders,	
because	it	is	fitting	for	us	to	prefer	the	state	of	our	not	murdering	to	
the	state	of	four	more	lives	being	saved.	While	it	seems	appropriate	
to	be	somewhat	specially	concerned	about	one’s	own	moral	charac-
ter,	it	seems	monstrously	narcissistic	to	look	more	fondly	upon	the	
state	 of	 not	 being	 a	murderer	 oneself	 than	on	 the	 survival	 of	 four	
individuals.	The	non-consequentialist,	unlike	 the	 relativized	conse-
quentialist,	can	hold	that	it	is	fitting	to	value	the	survival	of	four	in-
dividuals	more	than	one’s	own	moral	purity,	but	that	what	states	it	
is	fitting	to	value	doesn’t	always	settle	what	to	do.	We	are	simply	not	
permitted	to	save	the	five	by	performing	a	murder	ourselves,	because	
it	 is	fitting	to	 feel	much	more	strongly	obligated	not	 to	kill	 than	to	
merely	fail	to	save.	This,	we	believe,	is	a	much	more	plausible	way	of	
understanding	agent-centered	constraints.	
As	we	indicated	above,	there	is	still	a	bottom-up	case	to	be	made	
against	 the	 initial	plausibility	of	non-consequentialist	 ideas,	so	even	
if	we	 are	 successful	 in	 dispatching	 the	 top-down	 strategy,	 impartial	
So	whatever	considerations	turn	out	to	be	moral	reasons,	they	are	
conceptually	guaranteed	to	be	fittingness	reasons	to	feel	obligated	to	
perform	or	omit	acts,	and	consequently	genuine	practical	reasons	to	
perform	or	omit	them.	As	we	have	seen,	these	practical	reasons	gener-
ated	by	the	fittingness	of	act-directed	motives	are	just	as	basic	as,	and	
need	no	sanction	from,	the	state-directed	reasons	generated	by	the	fit-
tingness	of	state-directed	motives	which	constitute	the	goodness	and	
badness	of	states	of	affairs.	So	even	if	we	reject	the	consequentialist	
thesis	that	all	moral	reasons	must	be	reasons	to	promote	the	good,	it	
should	be	just	as	clear	why	there	is	practical	reason	to	be	moral	as	why	
there	is	practical	reason	to	promote	the	good.	This,	we	believe,	should	
demystify	not	only	how	there	can	be	genuine	practical	reason	to	do	
things	other	than	promote	good	outcomes,	but	how	some	of	these	rea-
sons	can	be	genuinely	moral.
6. Conclusion
We	 have	 thus	 argued	 that,	 because	 there	 is	 no	mystery	 about	 how	
there	could	be	reasons	to	do	things	other	than	promote	the	good	that	
are	both	practical	and	moral,	the	top-down	strategy	of	arguing	for	con-
sequentialism	 fails.	 The	 deep	 theoretical	 connection	 between	 good	
states	 and	 reasons	 to	promote	 them	 is	 a	 special	 instance	of	 a	more	
general	connection	between	fitting	attitudes	and	reasons	to	act	as	they	
would	motivate	us.	Another	instance	of	this	connection	is	that	between	
be	state-directed,	if	they	were	ultimately	generated	by	the	intrinsic	desirabil-
ity	of	the	state	of	their	being	performed	(this	is	essentially	how	proponents	
of	 relativized	 consequentialism	 portray	 reasons	 to	 observe	 agent-centered	
constraints).	R	is	an	intrinsic	reason	to	respond	in	way	W	(e. g.	to	desire	that	
Leslie	is	not	in	pain,	bring	it	about	that	she	is	not	in	pain,	feel	obligated	not	
to	cause	her	pain,	or	omit	causing	her	pain)	if	R	counts	in	favor	of	W	simply	
in	virtue	of	describing	what	W’s	object	 is	 in	itself	(e. g.	Leslie’s	not	being	in	
pain	or	the	act	of	causing	her	pain)	and	independent	of	this	object’s	relation	
to	anything	else.	But	the	“simply	in	virtue”	here	indicates	only	that	there	is	no	
further	normative factor	that	makes	it	the	case	that	R	counts	in	favor	of	W.	It	is	
consistent	with	R’s	being	an	intrinsic	reason	to	W	that	there	is	some	further	
conceptual explanation	of	how	R	comes	to	count	in	favor	of	W,	such	as	by	R’s	
counting	in	the	first	instance	in	favor	of	feeling	obligated	to	do	whatever	will	
bring	about	the	state	of	Leslie’s	not	being	in	pain,	and	(given	WCP	and	MAP)	
R’s	consequently	counting	in	favor	of	bringing	it	about	that	she	is	not	in	pain.
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by	the	fact	that	everyone	would	(at	least	under	the	right	conditions)	
have	strongest	non-moral	reasons	to	agree	to	their	adoption.57
If	we	are	right	about	morality’s	direct	connection	 to	practical	 rea-
sons,	it	makes	no	more	sense	to	take	this	pragmatic	design	stance	to-
wards	what	should	count	as	morally	right	than	it	would	to	take	it	to-
wards	what	should	count	as	non-morally	good	or	reasonable.	We	have	
argued	 that	non-moral	 considerations	 are	genuine	practical	 reasons	
because	 they	make	 for	 the	fittingness	of	non-moral	motives.	But,	as	
we	have	argued,	moral	reasons	are	considerations	that	make	for	the	
fittingness	of	feelings	of	obligation,	which	are	guaranteed	to	be	practi-
cal	reasons	by	the	same	general	connection	between	fitting	motives	
and	reasons	to	act.	To	paraphrase	Frankena	(1963,	98),	it	would	give	
morality	 too	despotic	 a	 role	 in	 our	 practical	 lives	 to	 insist	 that	 non-
moral	motives	can	be	fitting	only	if	they	are	“made	for”	or	achieve	what	
there	is	moral	reason	to	achieve.	But	if	we	are	right	that	the	fittingness	
of	moral	motives	is	just	as	directly	connected	to	practical	reasons	as	
that	of	our	non-moral	motives,	it	seems	to	give	morality	too	servile	a	
role	to	insist	(as	Frankena	evidently	did)	that	moral	motives	are	fitting	
only	if	they	are	“made	for”	or	achieve	what	there	is	non-moral	reason	
to	achieve.	
57.	 See	Harsanyi	1953;	Brandt	1988;	Gibbard	2008,	parts	 II–III;	and	Parfit	2011,	
ch.	 15–17.	Of	 course,	 there	 are	 versions	 of	 contractualism	which	hold	 that	
moral	principles	are	justified	just	in	case	no	one	could	reasonably	reject	them,	
where	moral	considerations	can	determine	what	it	is	reasonable	to	reject.	As	
McGinn	1999,	Kamm	2002,	and	Hooker	2002	argue,	Scanlon	1998	slips	into	
such	a	view	 in	deriving	 substantive	moral	 conclusions	 from	his	version	of	
contractualism,	and	Rawls	1971	(esp.	sec.	4)	seemed	to	slip	into	such	a	view	
in	ecumenically	motivating	the	veil	of	ignorance	as	an	epistemic	device	for	
purging	ourselves	of	biases.	But,	as	McGinn,	Kamm,	Hooker,	and	Parfit	note,	
by	presupposing	the	moral	reasons	the	device	of	agreement	is	supposed	to	
explain,	these	versions	of	contractualism	make	the	device	redundant	and	suf-
fer	from	vicious	circularity.	
	 	 Because	the	design	stances	of	indirect	consequentialism	and	contractual-
ism	are	so	similar,	it	is	not	surprising	that	so	many	indirect	consequentialists	
have	supported	their	views	by	appealing	to	contractualist	ideas.	Indeed,	con-
siderations	offered	by	Gibbard	2008	and	Pogge	 1995	 strongly	 suggest	 that	
any	genuinely	non-redundant	version	of	contractualism	will	be	a	form	of	in-
direct	consequentialism.
consequentialism	will	not	be	left	unmotivated.55	But,	as	we	explained,	
many	arguments	that	seem	largely	bottom-up	tacitly	rely	on	the	top-
down	strategy	in	demanding	a	special	kind	of	justification	for	moral	
reasons	that	do	not	direct	us	to	promote	the	good.	As	such,	we	think	
the	 elimination	 of	 the	 top-down	 strategy	 significantly	 weakens	 the	
overall	case	for	consequentialism.	But	the	most	salutary	effect	of	our	
argument	on	the	case	for	impartial	consequentialism	might	be	to	force	
its	proponents	to	distill	the	potentially	powerful	bottom-up	elements	
from	the	unsuccessful	top-down	ones,	and	to	explain	more	clearly	why	
we	should	think	the	plausibility	of	non-consequentialist	ideas	cannot	
survive	reflective	scrutiny.
Finally,	we	think	that	our	argument	has	the	potential	to	undermine	
theories	other	than	direct	consequentialism	that	rely	on	the	idea	that,	
in	order	to	be	practically	relevant,	morality	must	achieve	ends	that	we	
have	non-moral	reasons	to	care	about.	Although	indirect	consequen-
tialists	do	not	think	moral	requirements	must	direct	us	to	promote	the	
good,	they	still	take	a	“design	stance”	towards	morality	by	holding	that,	
in	order	to	be	justified,	a	system	of	moral	requirements	must	promote	
the	good	more	than	any	other	system	society	could	adopt.56 
Non-redundant	 forms	 of	 contractualism	 take	 a	 similar	 design	
stance	towards	morality	by	holding	that	moral	principles	are	justified	
55.	 These	 non-consequentialist	 ideas	 are	 exactly	 the	 ones	 relativized	 conse-
quentialists	 seek	 to	 preserve	 by	 “consequentializing”	 them,	 so	 their	 being	
undermined	 would	 support	 impartial	 consequentialism	 over	 both	 non-
consequentialism	 and	 relativized	 consequentialism.	While	 Portmore	 (2011,	
103–111)	provides	interesting	“bottom-up”	arguments	against	certain	(“victim-
focused”)	versions	of	non-consequentialism,	he	explicitly	acknowledges	that	
that	these	arguments	do	not	work	against	all	versions	of	non-consequential-
ism.	Our	point	in	the	last	paragraph	suggests,	moreover,	that	if	you	want	to	
be	“agent-focused”	about	agent-centered	constraints,	it	is	better	to	treat	them	
as	act-directed	considerations	that	make	it	fitting	for	agents	to	be	more	mo-
tivated	to	omit	certain	acts	than	as	state-directed	considerations	that	make	it	
fitting	for	agents	to	be	more	“concerned	about”	their	performing	them.	
56.	See	for	instance	Brandt	1967	(esp.	114)	and	Hooker	2000	(esp.	ch.	1).
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